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SOCIAL JUSTICE AND DEPOSIT RETURN
CALCULATIONS:
A STUDY OF SUCCESS AND FAILURE IN
COMMERCIAL LAW REFORM
WILLIAM H. WIDEN†
INTRODUCTION
The time has come to address ambiguity in the interpretation
of the Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”) provisions governing the
return of deposits to defaulting buyers found in subsections
2-718(2) and (3) of Article 2 governing the sale of goods.1 In brief,
the concern is that ambiguity in the drafting of UCC § 2-718(2)
and (3) allows courts to understate the restitution amount
returnable to a defaulting buyer who made a deposit on a contract
for the sale of goods. This mistaken interpretation allows sellers
to retain a premium or penalty, in addition to compensation for
actual damages. Recent case law creates the risk that this
“penalty” interpretation will become the norm.2 Although the
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1
U.C.C. § 2-718 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2018). Section 2-718
appears in the same form today as it appeared when the official version of the U.C.C.
was adopted in 1962. Following withdrawal of proposed revisions to U.C.C. Article 2,
as discussed in this article, the official version of Article 2 reverted to that
promulgated in 1962 but for a few conforming amendments to Article 2 adopted as
part of revisions to U.C.C. Article 7 in 2003. Amendments to Article 2 proposed in
2003 were withdrawn in 2011. The U.C.C. was last amended in 2018 but those
amendments are not relevant to the matters discussed in this article. The UCC is a
joint project of the American Law Institute (“ALI”) and the Uniform Law Commission
(“ULC”). During the bulk of the legislative history discussed herein, the ULC was
known as the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
(“NCCUSL”).
2
See infra Part I text accompanying notes 14–33. The troubling cases appear in
New York. This raises particular concerns. New York decisions command added
respect around the country in commercial matters because the court system includes
the Commercial Division, which handles complicated commercial cases as part of the
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maximum dollar amount of the penalty is, at most, $500 in any
one case, the “penalty” interpretation nonetheless raises social
justice concerns that must be addressed.
Empirical studies show that many Americans are unable to
pay an unexpected $500 debt.3 Twenty-five percent of American
families have less than $400 in savings.4 More broadly, in 2017,
forty percent of adults report that they or their families had
trouble meeting at least one basic need for food, health care,
housing or utilities.5 Though $500 may appear small in a legal
setting—given the myriad court costs, legal fees, and expenses
associated with any case—social science research shows that the
loss of this amount would create real economic hardship for many
individuals and families.
Given this economic reality, stewardship of the law requires
that sellers not be overcompensated for their losses unless the
parties have otherwise agreed to an enforceable liquidated
damages clause.6 As explained below, neither the language nor
the history of UCC § 2-718(2) and (3) require the imposition of a
penalty or premium as part of the UCC’s scheme of default rules.
Significantly, a proposed amendment to the UCC that would have
addressed this problem was abandoned.7

Supreme Court of the State of New York. The respect extends beyond those cases
specifically handled by the Commercial Division.
3
Maggie McGrath, 63% Of Americans Don't Have Enough Savings to Cover a
$500 Emergency, FORBES (Jan. 6, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/maggiemcgrath/
2016/01/06/63-of-americans-dont-have-enough-savings-to-cover-a-500-emergency.
4
THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, THE ROLE OF EMERGENCY SAVINGS IN FAMILY
FINANCIAL
SECURITY:
WHAT
RESOURCES
DO
FAMILIES
HAVE
FOR
FINANCIAL EMERGENCIES? 6 (2015), http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/assets/2015/
11/emergencysavingsreportnov2015.pdf.
5
MICHAEL KARPMAN ET AL., MATERIAL HARDSHIP AMONG NONELDERLY ADULTS
AND THEIR FAMILIES IN 2017 2 (2018), https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/
publication/98918/material_hardship_among_nonelderly_adults_and_their_families_
in_2017.pdf.
6
See U.C.C. § 2-718(1). An argument for substantive law reform that limits
deposit retention and liquidated damages clauses in consumer contracts—regardless
of any purported agreement—is beyond the scope of this article. For some types of
transactions, a state consumer protection law may apply. See, e.g., UNIF. CONSUMER
CREDIT CODE § 2.504 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1968); see also Robert L. Jordan and
William D. Warren, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 387,
441 (1968) (discussing home solicitation credit sales).
7
Recommendation of the Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial
Code to Withdraw the 2003 Amendments to UCC Articles 2 and 2A from the Official
Text of the Uniform Commercial Code, reprinted in 65 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 150
(2011). See generally Scott J. Burnham, Thoughts on the Withdrawal of Amended
Article 2, 52 S. TEX. L. REV. 519 (2011).
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The following tells a story of how the mechanics of current law
reform have failed to address problems of particular concern to
low-income people. This failure occurs in the shadow of prior
successes that made the law of deposit returns fairer, but not
perfect. In an age of increasing income inequality, it is important
to understand and address this phenomenon. The law-making
process that generated the law appears powerless to fix it. This
circumstance raises the larger question of how to address these
types of problems without derailing large meritorious projects.
Essentially, there is a fundamental design failure on two
levels: first, the usage of the law in actual cases does not track the
practice envisioned by the UCC drafters; and second, the
traditional amendment process for the UCC is not capable of
dealing with problems revealed by the operation of the law in
action when it differs from the usage anticipated by its structure.
As to the actual usage of the law, it will be shown, in deposit
return cases, that the UCC appears to be functioning like a civil
code, not like the “common law” code envisioned by its creators.8
In practice, courts and parties tend to apply the law following a
surface reading of the statute, as is done in a civil law system.9
Use of the UCC as a civil code, treating it as though it is complete
and gapless, partly explains the erroneous judicial decisions
relating to deposit return calculations and why the common law
structure of decision and precedent has failed to correct these
injustices.10
Regarding the amendment process, despite enormous effort,
the traditional law revision procedures orchestrated through the
ALI and the ULC failed to address the first system-design failure

8

See, e.g., John E. Murray, Jr., An Effective Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial
Code: Who is Responsible?, 11 DUQ. BUS. L.J. 123 (2009) (confirming that “[t]here has
never been any doubt that the Uniform Commercial Code, especially Article 2, was
not designed as a civil code”).
9
See generally Gunther A. Weiss, The Enchantment of Codification in the
Common-Law World, 25 YALE J. INT’L L. 435 (2000) (explaining the simple dichotomy
between civil law and common law, while suggesting the reality is more complex).
“The ideal was that the code could answer all legal questions and that it would not be
necessary to fall back on judges’ opinions, customs, or scholarly wisdom.” Id. at 456.
10
A surface reading of the statute should suffice in a civil law system because its
ideal form is complete and gapless. “It is often claimed that codification has no gaps.
Then, it is said, the judge’s role is limited to mechanical application of the code, and
the judge is, in Montesquieu's words, only the ‘mouthpiece’ of the code.” Id. at 458.
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when they withdrew the proposed amendment to Article 2.11 The
cumbersome amendment process itself constitutes a second
system-design failure.
Primary blame for the failure to enact revised Article 2 rests
with state legislatures, influenced by special interests concerned
with matters unrelated to deposit return calculations.12 The
shortcomings of the ALI and ULC rest with a structural inability
to deal with important, but technical, fixes outside of the grand
amendment. When the UCC operates as a civil code, the
conventional apparatus of a Permanent Editorial Board comment,
ideally suited to certain types of technical corrections, will not
suffice as a second-best solution if the intended audience does not
read it. 13
Accordingly, the case is made for a populist takeover of the
amendment process, state by state, to correct the social injustice
of deposit return calculations where established institutions of
reform have failed.14 Based on the research presented here, the
most important state for an amendment is New York, since that
jurisdiction is both influential and the one in which case law has
advocated for the “penalty” interpretation.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I describes case law
which uses a “penalty” interpretation for § 2-718(2) and (3).
Part II describes case law in which courts do not apply a penalty.
Part III offers a penalty-free interpretation for § 2-718(2) and (3)
11
See Burnham, supra note 7, at 525–27. The failure was not a result of capture
of the ALI or the ULC by special interest groups. See generally Edward J. Janger,
Predicting When the Uniform Law Process Will Fail: Article 9, Capture, and the Race
to the Bottom, 83 IOWA L. REV. 569, 585–86 (1998).
12
See William H. Henning, Amended Article 2: What Went Wrong?, 11 DUQ. BUS.
L.J. 131, 133–34 (2008).
13
The Permanent Editorial Board (“PEB”) is composed of members from the ALI
and the ULC. It prepares commentaries and advises its member organizations on
further changes needed to the UCC. Its activities with respect to the UCC are
governed by an agreement dated July 31, 1986, as amended January 18, 1998, among
the ALI, ULC, and PEB. Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial
Code: Agreement Describing the Relationship of the American Law Institute, the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, and the Permanent
Editorial Board with Respect to the Uniform Commercial Code (July 31, 1986),
https://www.ali.org/media/filer_public/54/d2/54d2249e-61df-4c33-bba7-b539bf8a5b99
/agreement-peb-ucc.pdf.
14
The North Carolina legislature is unique in addressing this problem, albeit
limited to the context of layaway plans. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-718(2)(c). See
HAWKLAND, UNIF. COM. CODE SERIES, LOCAL CODE VARIATIONS, 2017-2018 EDITION
366–69 (2017). The North Carolina variation is discussed in Part VI. In fact, the North
Carolina legislature appears to have botched the amendment. See infra Part VI notes
and accompanying text.
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that remains true to the statutory language. These three parts
make extensive use of numerical examples and explanations.
Although the presentation may seem dense in parts, an
appreciation of the numbers is essential to understanding both the
problem and the solution.
Part IV describes the drafting history of § 2-718(2) and (3) to
support the preferred interpretation. Understanding how we got
here motivates the impetus for reform by revealing the complete
lack of justification for the penalty interpretation. Part V explains
that correcting the penalty interpretation has the potential to
positively impact the lives of many low-income individuals, people
for whom $500 is by no means a small calculation quibble. Here,
structural concerns and system-design failures are discussed as
important factors in favor of reform. The Article concludes in Part
VI with a defense of a populist agenda for a non-uniform
amendment to the UCC, including an appendix offering the simple
statutory fix for proposal to state legislatures. It describes the
kind of theory of legislation required to advocate for change
despite the risk that such a change poses for uniformity in the law.
I.

THE ARITHMETIC, CASE LAW, AND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION CREATING A PENALTY

The recent cases adopting the “penalty” interpretation arise
in New York. Gongora v. Eye Gallery of Scarsdale is a recent
example.15 In that case, Gongora brought a small claims action to
recover a $750 deposit that she provided to Eye Gallery of
Scarsdale toward the purchase of a pair of eyeglasses for a total
purchase price of $1,380.16 At trial, defendant proved actual
damages of $250 from Gongora’s breach, representing the cost of
lenses which Eye Gallery could not resell.17
For reasons not explained, the small claims court dismissed
the action, apparently allowing defendant Eye Gallery of
Scarsdale to retain the entire $750 deposit.18 The appellate court
reversed, directing entry of judgment of $224 for Gongora as
restitution.19 This allowed defendant Eye Gallery to retain $526
of the deposit, rather than the full $750 amount allowed by the
trial court.
15
16
17
18
19

51 Misc. 3d 140(A), 37 N.Y.S.3d 207 (2d Dep’t 2016).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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The court properly20 began its analysis by noting that UCC
§ 2-718 governed the treatment of the deposit:
Section 2-718 of the Uniform Commercial Code provides, in
pertinent part, that, in the absence of a contractual provision
with respect to the liquidation or limitation of damages and the
return of deposits,
“(2) Where the seller justifiably withholds delivery of goods
because of the buyer’s breach, the buyer is entitled to
restitution of any amount by which the sum of his payments
exceeds . . .
(b) . . . twenty per cent of the value of the total performance
for which the buyer is obligated under the contract or $500,
whichever is smaller.
(3) The buyer’s right to restitution under subsection (2) is
subject to offset to the extent that the seller establishes
(a) a right to recover damages under the provisions of this
Article other than subsection (1), and
(b) the amount or value of any benefits received by the buyer
directly or indirectly by reason of the contract.”21

Pursuant to subsection (2)(b), the court determined that
defendant could retain a base amount of $276.22 The result of the
twenty percent or $500 calculation under (2)(b) is hereafter called
the “base retention amount.” This $276 represents twenty
percent of the value of total performance owed by Gongora—0.2 x
$1,380, the value of total performance for which the buyer was
obligated. Per the statute, the defendant’s entitlement extends to
the smaller $276 amount, rather than to the larger $500 amount.
Considering subsection (2)(b) in isolation, defendant should return
the balance of the deposit—$474—to Gongora as a restitution
amount. However, subsection (2)(b) does not function in isolation.
Pursuant to subsection (3)(a), the base retention amount
increases by damages, which the seller may recover under Article
2 because these damages are an offset, or reduction, to the
restitution amount owed to the buyer.23 If the total retention
20
The eyeglasses satisfy the UCC definition of a “good.” See U.C.C. § 2-105(1)
(AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW. COMM’N 2018) (A good includes “all things . . . which are
movable at the time of identification to the contract for sale.”). Thus, eyeglasses fit
under the UCC’s scope of coverage. See U.C.C. § 2-102 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW.
COMM’N 2018) (specifying Article 2 coverage for “transactions in goods”).
21
Gongora, 51 Misc. 3d 140(A), 37 N.Y.S.3d 207.
22
Id.
23
Article 2 generally provides for damages available to a seller, with the special
case of damages available upon a buyer’s insolvency contained in section 2-702. See
generally U.C.C. §§ 2-703–2-710 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW. COMM’N 2018).
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amount for the seller increases by proof of damages, the restitution
amount owed to the buyer decreases. On one reading of the
statute, the total amount a seller may retain is determined
pursuant to an additive formula: base retention amount plus
damages equals total retention amount. Using the additive
method of computation, the base retention amount is the premium
or penalty kept by the seller above actual damages.
As the appellate court noted, the buyer’s restitution amount
decreases because it is subject to a reduction by “offset” under
subsection (3)(a) to the extent that the seller establishes “a right
to recover damages under the provisions of this Article other than
subsection (1).”24 Subsection (1) is not relevant here because that
subsection deals with contracts in which the parties have specified
a liquidated sum as damages. The appellate court noted that
defendant did not prove any damages other than the $250 loss
related to the lenses, nor had it established that Gongora received
any other amount or benefit by reason of the contract, so
subsection (3)(b) did not apply.25
The additive method used by the appellate court in Gongora
required that subsection (2)(b) and subsection (3)(a) be applied in
two separate and unrelated steps. Under subsection (2)(b), the
first step determines a base retention amount for the seller. That
base retention amount is equal to the lesser of twenty percent of
the value of total performance and $500. Having determined the
base retention amount under subsection (2)(b), the next
calculation determines whether the seller may establish the right
to recover damages under another section of Article 2.
The base retention amount is added to the actual damage
amount to which the seller may establish a right, creating a total
retention amount for the seller. The restitution amount owed to
the buyer is simply the amount of the deposit minus this total
retention amount. On the additive method, the computation of the
base retention amount has no impact on the actual damage
amount to which the seller may establish a right under another
provision of Article 2.

Separate sections provide for damages available to a buyer. See U.C.C. §§ 2-711–2717 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW. COMM’N 2018). It is the former seller-directed
sections to which the UCC refers when it refers to “a right to recover damages under
the provisions of this Article other than subsection (1).” U.C.C. § 2-718(3)(a) (AM. LAW
INST. & UNIF. LAW. COMM’N 2018).
24
U.C.C. § 2-718(3)(a).
25
Gongora, 51 Misc. 3d 140(A), 37 N.Y.S.3d 207.
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The Gongora appellate court arguably applied the law
correctly to the facts, considering each twist and turn in the
statute. In allowing the retention of a penalty amount exceeding
actual damages, the court cited the old precedent of Feinberg v.
Bongiovi26 to support its computation. In Feinberg, the plaintiff
ordered wood from defendant, placing down a deposit of $400.27
The contract price for the wood ordered was $895.28 The court
computed twenty percent of the contract price at $179, which is
less than $500.29 This created a base retention amount of $179.
However, the seller had incurred a cost of $50 relating to a
notification given to the woodcutter.30 The notification charge
appears to be the only damage incurred by the seller, though the
court does not expressly say so.
The Feinberg computation of the restitution amount followed
the Gongora pattern: deposit amount—$400—minus total
retention amount—$229—equals a restitution amount of $171. A
few months after Gongora, the additive method was used in
McCann v. McSorley.31 In McCann, plaintiff made a deposit of
$1,800 toward a $3,320 purchase order of canvas slipcovers.32
After plaintiff repudiated his order, the court computed
restitution:
[S]ubstantial justice (see UDCA 1804, 1807) requires that
plaintiff be awarded his $1,800 deposit, less $500 (which is the
smaller amount pursuant to UCC 2-718[2][b]), and less $600 in
damages that defendant established pursuant to UCC
2-718(3)(a), for a total award in the principal sum of $700 in favor
of plaintiff on his cause of action.33

Starting with Feinberg and extending to the recent decisions
of Gongora and McCann, New York courts have employed a
consistent approach—the additive method—to determine the
restitution amount owed to a defaulting buyer who has made a

26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33

110 Misc. 2d 379, 442 N.Y.S.2d 399 (Dist. Ct. Suffolk Cnty. 1981).
Id.
Id. at 380, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 399.
Id.
Id.
53 Misc. 3d 48, 39 N.Y.S.3d 583 (2d Dep’t 2016).
Id. at 49, 39 N.Y.S.3d at 585.
Id. at 51, 39 N.Y.S.3d at 586.
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deposit. This calculation method creates a premium or penalty in
most cases.34
This consistency, however, violates binding
precedent in New York, as explained in Part II.
II. CASE LAW WITH NO PENALTY OR PREMIUM
Courts do not universally apply the additive method to
compute deposit return amounts under UCC § 2-718(2) and (3).
Most courts simply perform the calculation without including a
penalty, by implication rejecting the additive method, but
unfortunately often without any explanation of the statutory basis
for the calculation.
The courts in Gongora, Feinberg, and McCann were erroneous
in their application of the additive method; indeed, this
methodology is directly contrary to the method utilized by the New
York Court of Appeals in the case of Neri v. Retail Marine Corp.35
The courts in Gongora, Feinberg, and McCann might have
followed the calculation method used by the highest court in New
York, but they did not.36
In Neri, the plaintiffs agreed to purchase a boat for the price
of $12,587.40, making a deposit of $4,250.37 The trial court allowed
the defendant seller to keep $500 and directed it to return the
balance of the deposit, or $3,750, to plaintiff.38 The trial court
treated subsection (2)(b) as a stand-alone provision, ignoring the
possibility contained in subsection (3)(a) that the restitution
amount might be reduced to the extent that a defendant can show
damages under another section of Article 2.

34
A premium or penalty will not exist if the actual damages proved equal or
exceed the total amount of the deposit.
35
30 N.Y.2d 393, 334 N.Y.S.2d 165 (1972).
36
The Court of Appeals interpreted subsection (3)(a) to provide an “alternative”
to the retention of $500 under subsection (2)(b), at least strongly implying—if not
outright holding—that use of the additive method is improper. This makes the cases
of Gongora, Feinberg, and McCann harder to understand because the Court of Appeals
is binding precedent. A Missouri court cited Neri and the alternative approach with
approval; however, it remanded the case for further proceedings. Anheuser v. Oswald
Refractories Co., Inc., 541 S.W.2d 706, 712 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976).
37
Neri, 30 N.Y.2d at 396, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 166–67.
38
Id. at 397, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 167.
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The record showed defendant suffered damages of $3,253,
consisting of $2,579 in lost profits39 and incidental damages of
$674.40 The court computed the restitution amount due to plaintiff
as follows: deposit amount—$4,250—minus actual damages—
$3,253—equals a restitution amount of $997. Significantly, the
court did not allow defendant to retain an additional penalty as
was permitted in Gongora, Feinberg, and McCann—no base
retention amount for the seller was included in the calculation.
Had it done so, plaintiff would have been entitled to a smaller
restitution amount of $497 because the penalty would have
equaled $500—that is, 0.2 x $12,587.40 = $2,517.48—which is
greater than $500, so $500 would have been used as the base
retention amount.
The Neri court applied UCC § 2-718, but explained little else:
As above noted, the trial court awarded defendant an offset in the
amount of $500 under paragraph (b) and directed restitution to
plaintiffs of the balance. Section 2-718, however, establishes, in
paragraph (a) of subsection (3), an alternative right of offset in
favor of the seller, as follows: ‘(3) The buyer’s right to restitution
under subsection (2) is subject to offset to the extent that the
seller establishes (a) a right to recover damages under the
provisions of this Article other than subsection (1)’. 41

The Neri court stated that subsection (3)(a) is an “alternative”
but did not explain why it is not “additive,” as lower New York
courts would later construe the statute.42 The statutory language,
however, appears to contemplate that subsections (2)(b) and (3)(a)
work together and not in the alternative.
The calculation method used in Neri, however, is consistent
with dicta in a prior New York Court of Appeals case in which the
Court describes the operation of § 2-718(2) and (3):
That does not necessarily mean, however, that [the seller] would
be entitled to retain as against [the buyer] only $500 of the
$217,279.66 which was [the buyer]’s part payment on these
contracts. The Uniform Commercial Code allows the seller actual
damages where liquidated damages have not been
stipulated . . . . Manifestly, if [the buyer] defaulted on these
39

The Neri case is most famous for its explanation of when and why lost profits
may form an element of damages under Article 2 for a lost volume seller and appears
in many contracts casebooks. See Mark Pettit, Jr., Exercising with Neri v. Retail
Marine Corp., 44 ST. LOUIS L.J. 1487 (2000) (naming casebooks which use Neri).
40
Neri, 30 N.Y.2d at 401, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 171.
41
Id. at 397, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 168 (emphasis supplied).
42
Id.
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contracts, [the seller] was entitled to retain as against [the buyer]
so much of the $217,279.66 part payment as would be necessary
to offset its damages due to a falling market plus incidental
damages, such as extra transportation, storage, legal expense,
and other items to which it was subjected by [the buyer]’s
default.43

It is clear that the Court of Appeals does not endorse the additive
method because it makes no mention of a base retention amount
to which actual damages are added. The court simply states that
actual damages would be satisfied out of the prior payments.44
The Neri case is not unique in failing to allow a seller to retain
both a penalty and its actual damages. In a Florida case, Honsberg
v. Lystra,45 the court apparently rejected the additive method. In
Honsberg, plaintiffs made a $10,000 deposit towards the purchase
of a mobile home costing a total of $28,000.46 The trial court
determined actual damages of $4,826.26, leaving a deposit balance
of $5,173.74.47 The appellate court ordered this balance returned
to the breaching buyer as restitution.48
Note that if the Florida appellate court had followed the
additive method used in Gongora, Feinberg, and McCann, the
court would have first identified a base retention amount for the
seller—which, on these facts, would have been $500. Then it
would have added the actual damages to the base retention
amount, arriving at a total retention amount of $5,326.26.
Subtracting this from the deposit of $10,000, the restitution
amount should have been $4,673.74, and not $5,173.74.
Unfortunately, the Honsberg court does not explain how its
calculation complies with § 2-718. It simply states that the
contract was “not a provision for liquidated damages.”49 Because
the Honsberg contract did not contain a liquidated damages
clause, subsection (2)(b) would seem to apply, allowing the seller
to keep the base retention amount. This would put the additive
method in play, had the court adopted it.

43
Procter & Gamble Distrib. Co. v. Lawrence Am. Field Warehousing Corp., 16
N.Y.2d 344, 354–55, 266 N.Y.S.2d 785, 792–93 (1965).
44
Id., 266 N.Y.S.2d at 793.
45
410 So. 2d 661 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
46
Id. at 662.
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
Id.
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The relevant provision of the Honsberg contract stated:
5. Upon failure or the refusal of the purchaser to complete said
purchase within 30 days of contract date, or an agreed extension
therefor for any reason (other than cancellation on account of
increase in price) the cash deposit may have such portion of it
retained as will reimburse the dealer for expenses and other losses
including attorney fees occasioned by purchaser’s failure to
complete said purchase. In the event a used car, trailer or
mobilehome [sic] has been taken in trade, the purchaser hereby
authorizes the dealer to sell said property, at public or private
sale, and to deduct from the proceeds thereof a sum equal to the
expenses and losses incurred, or suffered, by the dealer by reason
of purchaser’s failure to complete the transaction. Dealer shall
have all the rights of a seller, upon breach of contract, under the
Uniform Commercial Code 2–708, 2–710, 2–718, of the Uniform
Sales Act (as applicable).50

The court analyzed paragraph 5 of the contract as follows:
“This is not a provision for liquidated damages. It is, in fact,
exactly the opposite. Simply put, paragraph 5 says that the
deposit shall constitute a fund securing to the seller the actual
amount of damages he sustains by reason of buyers’ failure or
refusal to complete the purchase.”51
There are two ways to read Honsberg in light of this contract
section and the court’s statement. A proponent of the additive
method might say that the additive method is still an appropriate
calculation in Florida, despite Honsberg, because the actual
contract language should be interpreted to limit the use of the
deposit to only that which will reimburse the “dealer for expenses
and other losses.”52 On this reading, because the contract
language itself limits the retention amount to actual damages, it
overrides any generally applicable statutory method allowing for
a penalty in addition to actual damages—or so the proponents of
the additive method might argue.
The problem with this reading of Honsberg is that the contract
states at the end of paragraph 5 that “Dealer shall have all the
rights of a seller, upon breach of contract, under the Uniform
Commercial Code 2-708, 2-710 and 2-718 . . . .”53 If § 2-718 is
properly read by Gongora, Feinberg, and McCann to provide the
aggrieved seller with a premium or penalty, then the dealer in
50
51
52
53

Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Honsberg should have received it per the express contract
language referencing § 2-718, notwithstanding the earlier mention
in that clause of “dealer for expenses and other losses.”54 Seen this
way, the contract language makes clear that the deposit will be
used to secure payment of actual damages, but it does not say that
this is the exclusive use to which the deposit may be applied.
Indeed, quite the opposite is true by its reference to § 2-718.
While the matter is not clear given the brevity of the court’s
remarks, the reading of Honsberg pursuant to which the court
rejects the additive method is preferred because, if the court read
§ 2-718 to require the additive method, the contract language
would give the dealer the benefit of the premium or penalty by
virtue of paragraph 5’s express reference to § 2-718. That is to say,
Honsberg is consistent with Neri and not simply inapplicable to
the question.
Interestingly, a more recent federal district court applying
Florida law did not use the additive method either: “In total,
Validsa suffered $40,764,093.30 in damages. After considering the
$44,580,576.00 in advances that Defendants paid Validsa, the
Court finds that Defendants are entitled to recover
$3,816,482.70.”55
While the district court did not use the additive method, the
$500 premium or penalty which it declined to include in its
calculation is most likely a mere rounding error given the very
large deposit and damages. In the absence of an explanation for
the calculation, we can infer that the court did not approve of the
additive method; however, it is difficult to place much credence on
this case, considered in insolation, since $500 in the context of such
large figures is quite insignificant. Similarly, courts outside
Florida also have used the alternative approach and, in so doing,
have apparently rejected the additive method.56

54

Id.
Validsa, Inc. v. PDVSA Servs. Inc., No. 08-21682-CV, 2010 WL 411019, at *12
(S.D. Fla. Jan. 29, 2010), aff’d, 424 Fed. App’x 862 (11th Cir. 2011) (emphasis omitted).
Defendants would have recovered $500 less if the court had applied the
additive method.
56
See Anheuser v. Oswald Refractories Co., 541 S.W.2d 706 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976)
(applying Missouri law); Madsen v. Murrey & Sons Co., 743 P.2d 1212 (Utah 1987)
(applying Utah law); Conister Trust Ltd. v. Boating Corp. of America, No. M199800949-COA-R3-CV, 2002 WL 389864, (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 14, 2002) (applying
Tennessee law); Bowen v. Gardner, 425 S.W.3d 875 (Ark. Ct. App. 2013) (applying
Arkansas law).
55
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III. A THIRD PATH: THE CONTEXT SENSITIVE INTERPRETATION
The revelation of two different readings for UCC § 2-718(2)
and (3) is not new to the academic literature. Professor Pettit
noted the problem in a law review article illustrating how Neri
might be used in teaching an introductory contracts course.57
Though the article is styled as a dialogue—and no definitive
conclusion is reached other than to note the ambiguity—it appears
that Pettit favors the additive method because it better accounts
for the statutory language. In his view, the choice is between the
additive method and a reading which treats the statute as
requiring application of either subsection (2)(b) or subsection
(3)(a), but not both. Call this second option the “alternative”
approach, as was done in Neri.58
Under the alternative approach, a seller must either accept
the base retention amount computed under subsection (2)(b) or,
alternatively, retain only that portion of the deposit that
represents an offset for its actual damages under subsection (3)(a).
If those were the only two possible interpretations, the additive
method tracks the language better than the alternative approach
as a matter of statutory construction.
As drafted, there is no indication that one should apply either
subsection (2)(b) or subsection (3)(a), but not both; indeed, to
provide an “offset” to the restitution amount in subsection (2)(b),
as required by subsection (3)(a), the two subsections must work
together, not separately. The alternative approach, while creative,
does not track the statute well for this reason—though one can
look to the Neri case as precedent. Indeed, the cases that apply
the alternative approach rather than the additive method need to
explain better why a base retention amount is not included, as
apparently required by subsection (2)(b).
There is, however, a third way to read the statute which, in
most cases, does not result in the retention of a premium or
penalty. Call this calculation method the “context-sensitive”
method. This approach generally produces the same result as the
alternative approach arithmetically. It differs, however, in its
explanation for how that result is achieved, while giving a more
natural reading to the statutory language.

57
58

See Pettit, supra note 39, at 1497.
See supra text accompanying note 39.
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The context sensitive method computes the damages that a
seller has “a right to recover” under subsection (3)(a) after and in
light of the prior computation of the basic retention amount under
subsection (2)(b). For example, if one computes a basic retention
amount of $500 under subsection (2)(b), this $500 amount is
considered when computing the amount of actual damages that a
seller has a right to recover under subsection (3)(a). The amount
of damages computed under subsection (3)(a) includes only
damages in excess of the base retention amount. A seller holding
a deposit that exceeds its actual damages cannot prove a right to
recover more. This is because subsection (2)(b) does not create an
absolute or abstract entitlement in the seller.
The context sensitive method treats damages provable under
Article 2 as reduced by the basic retention amount because one
should not double count—and prove as damages—an amount for
which provision already has been made. To illustrate using the
facts of Feinberg, with a base retention amount of $179, the
woodcutter could not prove an additional $50 in damages under
another part of Article 2 because that element of damages is
already covered by the $179 base retention amount. While in
possession of $179, the woodcutter has no additional right to
recover under another part of Article 2.
The context sensitive method has the benefit of tracking the
statutory language and yet, in most cases, will not result in the
seller retaining a premium or penalty. The only circumstance in
which a premium or penalty might be retained in the context
sensitive method is a case in which the base retention amount
exceeds the amount of actual, provable damages.59 However, it
does not force a court to pick between application of subsection
(2)(b) and subsection (3)(a)—both sections are applied—and one
can achieve the Neri result without having to agree that
subsection (3)(a) is an “alternative” to subsection (2)(b).
Using the facts of McCann, we can illustrate the elimination
of the penalty or premium. There, the base retention amount was
$500, and the actual damages were $600, with a total deposit of
$1,800.60 In the context sensitive method, the seller would retain
its base retention amount of $500 under subsection (2)(b).
However, the seller would, in light of that retention, only be able
to establish a right to recover an additional $100 as damages, and
59
In such a case, subsection (2)(b) operates as a statutorily created liquidated
damages clause, as explained in infra Part IV at text accompanying note 129.
60
McCann v. McSorley, 53 Misc. 3d 48, 39 N.Y.S.3d 583 (2d Dep’t 2016).
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not $600. The additional $100 in damages is offset under
subsection (3)(b), reducing the restitution amount, and increasing
the retention amount to $600. The seller is compensated for its
actual losses, but not more, on these facts.
We can use the facts of Feinberg to illustrate the case of
premium or penalty retention using the context sensitive
calculation method. In Feinberg, the base retention amount was
computed at $179.61 The actual damages were $50.62 Using the
context sensitive computation method, the seller would simply
retain the base retention amount of $179 without an increase for
the actual damages. The interpretive theory is that, in light of the
retention of $179, the seller could not establish any damages under
another section of Article 2. Yet, a premium or penalty is still
retained because the base retention amount of $179 is greater
than the actual damages of $50. A similar result obtains in
Gongora because the base retention amount of $276 exceeds the
actual damages of $250. Although, on those facts, the premium is
reduced to a mere $26. The context sensitive method has the
salutary effect of eliminating penalties and premiums in many
cases, while reducing it, oftentimes substantially, in others.
An expansive use of the context sensitive approach in a case
like Feinberg might apply the offset more broadly, allowing the
proof of actual damages to serve as an offset to reduce the base
retention amount to $50. This expansive approach requires that
the contemplated offset might be positive or negative. Allowing
the offset to be a negative number is a less natural reading of the
term “offset.” The expansive use of the context sensitive method
produces a lower retention amount for the seller than the
alternative approach because, in the alternative approach, the
seller simply elects to retain the higher base retention amount.
While appealing as a matter of justice, the more expansive
reading of the context sensitive method creates the odd
circumstance of penalizing the seller for failing to demonstrate
actual damages equal to at least the base retention amount. As
nothing compels a seller to attempt to prove actual damages, it
places a seller in a better position for having proved nothing.
Santos v. DeBellis63 illustrates this fact pattern. In Santos v.
61
Feinberg v. Bongiovi Contracting, 110 Misc. 2d 379, 380, 442 N.Y.S.2d 399
(Dist. Ct. Suffolk Ctny. 1981).
62
Id.
63
28 Misc. 3d 48, 901 N.Y.S.2d 457 (2d Dep’t 2010). The fact pattern of the mobile
home purchase illustrates that even low-income persons make some large dollar

2019]

SOCIAL JUSTICE AND DEPOSIT RETURN

381

DeBellis, the plaintiff made a $6,000 deposit on the purchase of a
$33,000 mobile home and then defaulted on the purchase.64 The
defendant did not prove any actual damages.65 The court allowed
the defendant to retain $500 and required the return of $5,500 to
the plaintiff.66
While the context sensitive method tracks the statutory
language well—until one applies an expansive reading—it is
particularly appealing considering the odd and haphazard results
of the additive method.
In Gongora, the seller was
overcompensated for its loss by $276, an amount exceeding its
actual damages and, indeed, amounting to more than fifty percent
of the total recovery for the seller. In McCann, the seller was
overcompensated by $500, an amount equal to forty-five percent of
the total recovery. Alarmingly, in Feinberg, the seller was
overcompensated by $179, a figure that represents a massive
seventy eight percent of the total recovery. All three of these cases
present instances of unjust enrichment; moreover, the results of
each case are at odds with the general theory of contract damages,
that an innocent party should be compensated for its loss, but no
more.67
Beyond the avoidance of unjust results that violate basic
principles of contract law, four additional considerations support
the context sensitive method. First, the UCC expressly rejects the
imposition of penalties in the immediately preceding subsection,
§ 2-718(1), when the statute states that a liquidated damages
provision will not be enforced if it amounts to a penalty.68 Consider
how nonsensical it would be to expressly disallow a penalty in

purchases that might trigger the loss of $500 as a penalty. Mobile home and
automobile purchases often bring the full $500 penalty into play. Indeed, a low-income
person might well make a mobile home purchase in an attempt to obtain more
affordable housing. Further, while at first blush an expensive eyeglass purchase as in
Gongora may not generate immediate sympathy, increasing costs of medical-related
expenses make the $500 penalty a genuine social justice issue as well.
64
Id. at 49, 901 N.Y.S.2d 457.
65
Id. at 48, 901 N.Y.S.2d 457.
66
Id. at 49, 901 N.Y.S.2d 457.
67
See E. Allan Farnsworth, Legal Remedies for Breach of Contract, 70 COLUM.
L. REV. 1145, 1159 (1970).
68
U.C.C. § 2-718(1) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2018). Among other
circumstances, a liquidated damages formula creates a penalty when it always awards
the non-defaulting party more than actual damages. See Lake River Corp. v.
Carborundum Co., 769 F.2d 1284, 1290 (7th Cir. 1985).
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§ 2-718(1) and then to subsequently provide for a penalty by
operation of subsections 2-718(2) and (3) which immediately
follow.
Second, UCC § 1-305 states that penal damages are not
allowed “except as specifically provided in [the Uniform
Commercial Code] or by other rule of law.”69 While the operation
of subsections 2-718(2) and (3) could represent an instance in
which the drafters of the UCC intended to apply a penalty,
notwithstanding the fact that penalties are generally disfavored
for liquidated damages, a perfectly natural reading of the
statutory language exists which does not create these inconsistent
results.
Third, consider a case in which the actual damages exceed the
deposit amount. In that case, the seller will be permitted to bring
a lawsuit for the shortfall. The deposit simply functions as an
offset or credit against the damages that may be proved in excess
of the deposit. The seller does not retain an extra $500 in this
case, suggesting that the base retention amount does not create an
independent entitlement.
This is a natural methodology.
Importantly, the context sensitive method simply mirrors this
general approach by allowing the proof of damages only to the
extent that those damages exceed the base retention amount. One
might analogize the base retention amount as a kind of security
out of which damages are paid, just as the overall deposit functions
as a kind of security out of which damages may be paid.
Fourth, a leading treatise on the UCC contains a description
of the deposit return calculations that can support the context
sensitive method:
Section 2-718(3) then provides that if the seller is entitled to
recover additional damages, that is, no enforceable liquidated
damages provision under Section 2-718(1), the seller can offset
those damages against the amount the buyer has already paid.
This is in addition to the minimal amount of damages stated in
Section 2-718(2)(b).70

69
U.C.C. § 1-305 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2018) (alterations
in original).
70
See HAWKLAND ET AL., 2 HAWKLAND UCC SERIES, § 2-718:2 (2019) (emphasis
added) [hereinafter HAWKLAND]. Note the bias implicit in the characterization of the
subsection (2)(b) amount as “minimal.” Such an amount is not minimal for a large
number of individuals and families. See infra Part V text accompanying note 157.
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The treatise editors cite the additive method cases without
comment or criticism. However, the language of the treatise
summary is consistent with the context sensitive method.
The treatise refers to the amount recovered under subsection
(2)(b) as a “minimal amount of damages.” The amount recovered
under subsection (3)(a) is described as “additional damages.”
Though the treatise uses the language of “addition” in its
description, note that the treatise description contemplates
adding damages to damages. When adding damages to damages,
one should not double count.
The problem with the additive method used in Gongora,
Feinberg, and McCann is that the base retention amount is simply
treated as a generic amount to which the seller is entitled. Then
damages are separately computed pursuant to subsection (3)(a) to
which the base retention amount is added. However, if you treat
the base retention amount as representing minimal damages—at
least in cases for which damages exceed the base retention
amount71—then those minimal damages should not be included a
second time when computing the additional damages recoverable
pursuant to subsection (3)(a).
The capstone in support of the context sensitive method comes
from an analysis of the legislative history behind § 2-718 which is
described below in Part IV.
IV. WHERE DID THE TWENTY PERCENT OR $500 FORMULATION
COME FROM?
The interpretive procedure followed here disregards the
statement often prefacing draft versions of the UCC: “Proposed
statutory language may not be used to ascertain the intent or
meaning of any promulgated final statutory proposal.”72 Part IV

71
When damages do not exceed the base retention amount, the base retention
amount functions like a statutorily created liquidated damages amount. See infra Part
IV text accompanying note 130.
72
See, e.g., REVISION OF UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ARTICLE 2 – SALES (AM. L.
INST. & NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. ST. LAWS 1999). Karl Llewellyn
likely would have stopped analysis with Part III. He was against a deep dive into
legislative history as a mode of analysis for the UCC, preferring to use only the final
draft and its official annotations. See 1 AM. L. INST. & NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS
ON UNIF. ST. LAWS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE DRAFTS xvi (Elizabeth Slusser Kelly
ed. 1984) (“He did not want litigators to look behind the terminology of the Code to
the discussions and versions which preceded the final Code language.”).
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ignores this edict by considering proposed statutory language,
related reporters’ commentary, notes, annotations, prior statutes,
and the like.
The reason for this interpretive approach is simple—
§ 2-718(2) is an awkwardly drafted provision. While it can be
interpreted in isolation, a fuller understanding of the section can
be attained when one looks at where it came from and why it was
drafted. This requires consideration of its history, rather than
merely considering the final statutory language and official
comments.
There is a rich and deep literature about the theory of
interpretation of legal materials.73 However, reference to an
interpretive theory in this case would be unhelpful, primarily for
three reasons. First, the suggested context sensitive method is
available from a surface reading of the statute.74 Second,
justification for use of the context sensitive method to apply the
statute to facts makes no appeal to any specific canons of statutory
construction.75 Third, the purpose behind the legislative review
that follows amounts to negative assurance—there is nothing in
the legislative history to suggest another interpretation. This
review does not aim to search outside the statutory text for
interpretive clues.76
Section 2-718 as currently enacted derives from two separate
legislative processes: the New York legislature’s effort to
harmonize the treatment given to defaulting sellers and defaulting

73
See, e.g., William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, The Law of Interpretation, 130
HARV. L. REV. 1079, 1081 (2017); William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism and
Normative Canons, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 531, 531 (2013) (reviewing ANTONIN SCALIA
& BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS (2012)).
74
This is not a case in which appeal must be made to a matter outside the
statutory text, risking implementing a policy not approved by the legislature. See
Peter A. Alces & David Frisch, Commenting on “Purpose” in the Uniform Commercial
Code, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 419, 440 (1997).
75
Except, perhaps, for a principle to avoid doing inconsistent things—hardly a
rule of thumb worthy of its own legal category.
76
See Alces & Frisch, supra note 74, at 432–34. What matters for this exercise is
whether the analysis is persuasive and informative. Does it make one more confident
in the recommended application of the statute, or less confident? Whether the
approach is an exercise in “construction” or “interpretation,” textualist or purposivist,
or something else altogether, are categories of questions of only secondary importance.
If labels matter, perhaps call the approach followed here “legal voyeurism”—being
curious about the statute beyond the plain meaning of the text.
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buyers in sale of goods transactions under New York law;77 and the
effort, led by Karl Llewellyn, to revise the Uniform Sales Act.78
The project to revise the Uniform Sales Act, also under the
direction of Llewellyn, evolved into the creation of Article 2 of the
UCC.79 What follows is a story of an initial legislative success
which vastly improved the treatment of deposits for defaulting
buyers. Yet, in the current law reform structure, the system is
incapable of moving forward with further improvements.
The particular concern over treatment of deposits originated
in New York.80 The revised Uniform Sales Act project sought to
address the treatment of deposits, following New York’s lead.81
The treatment of deposits by Llewellyn’s team carried over from
the revised Uniform Sales Act process to the drafting of Article 2.82
In 1952, New York finally enacted an amendment to its
Personal Property Law in the form of § 145-a, to remove the
inconsistency between treatment of sellers and buyers in sale of
goods transactions.83 A note to the 1952 session law explained:
Under the Sales Act (Personal Property Law, § 125 (1)), if a seller
of goods fails to deliver all of the goods contracted for, he may
nevertheless recover for the goods delivered which the buyer
keeps. But if a buyer defaults after paying part of the price, he
may not recover the price he has paid even where it exceeds the
damages caused to the seller by the default, and even though the
buyer has received no benefit from the transaction. The purpose
of the amendment is to remove this inconsistency between the
remedies of a buyer of goods who defaults after part performance
and a seller of goods who defaults after part performance.84

77
New York commissioned a study of the law governing restitution at the
direction of Edwin W. Patterson. See STATE OF NEW YORK: REPORT OF THE LAW
REVISION COMMISSION FOR 1942, at 195 (N.Y. 1942).
78
See REPORT AND SECOND DRAFT, THE REVISED UNIFORM SALES ACT (1944),
reprinted in UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE CONFIDENTIAL DRAFTS (Elizabeth Slusser
Kelly ed. 1995) (listing Karl Llewellyn as the Reporter).
79
See U.C.C. cmt. at 3 (AM. LAW INST. & NAT’L. CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF.
STATE LAW, Proposed Final Draft 1950) (listing Karl Llewellyn as the Reporter).
80
See STATE OF NEW YORK, REPORT OF THE LAW REVISION COMMISSION FOR
1943, S. 227-229, Assemb. 215-217, at 23 (N.Y. 1943).
81
See infra text accompanying note 113.
82
See infra text accompanying note 121.
83
Act of April 19, 1952, ch. 823, 1952 N.Y. Laws 1789.
84
Id. (noting in margin “Personal Property Law, s. 145-a added”). The purpose,
as stated, does not refer to a premium or penalty; rather, it contemplates a return to
the buyer of the amount of the deposit in excess of damages sustained by the seller.
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The inconsistency in treatment for sellers and buyers arose
from an amendment to New York law in 1911—which created the
provision in the New York Sales Act § 125(1)—allowing a recovery
for a defaulting seller.85 Statutory fixes, however, were needed to
maintain consistent treatment for both sellers and buyers because
common law—particularly as strictly applied by New York
courts—did not allow a defaulting party to maintain a suit for
recovery of unjust enrichment in a sale of goods transaction, in
quasi-contract or as restitution.86
Though the fix for sellers preceded the fix for buyers by over
forty years, this may not be a simple case of the merchant lobby
taking care of its own concerns first. Rather, the problem for
buyers became more acute with the rise of layaway plans, a
practice which arose after World War I and continued as a popular
method to purchase goods, at least until the widespread use of
credit cards.87 In a layaway plan, the buyer makes a series of
deposits with a seller for application towards the purchase price.
When the amount deposited equals the purchase price, payment
for the good is complete, and the seller delivers the good to the
buyer.
At common law, if the buyer never completed its series of
deposits towards the purchase price, the amounts previously paid
were forfeit. In our modern world of Amazon, eBay, and large big
box retailers, the practice may seem foreign or quaint to some,
given the almost instant availability of a product, though
remnants of the practice exist today, particularly for lower income
groups.88
85
This occurred as part of the adoption by New York of the Uniform Sales Act in
1911. The model Uniform Sales Act was promulgated in 1906. See Robert Braucher,
The Legislative History of the Uniform Commercial Code, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 798, 799
(1958) (listing predecessor legislation to the UCC).
86
See REPORT OF THE LAW REVIEW COMMISSION FOR 1942, supra note 77, at 195.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 374 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) recognizes a right
to restitution for defaulting parties. The position of the ALI regarding every type of
restitution now is found in RESTATEMENT THIRD, RESTITUTION AND UNJUST
ENRICHMENT (AM. LAW INST. 2011). RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 374
cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1981) blandly and briefly refers to UCC § 2-718(2): “The case of
defaulting buyer of goods is governed by Uniform Commercial Code § 2-718(2), which
generally allows restitution of all but an amount fixed by that section.”
87
See Will Kenton, Layaway, INVESTOPEDIA (last updated June 25, 2019),
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/l/layaway.asp.
88
Layaway plans experience a resurgence in economic hard times. See Louis
Hyman, Laid Flat by Layaway, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 11, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/
2011/10/12/opinion/wal-marts-layaway-plan.html. (describing layaway plans as not
being in the best interest of consumers). Layaway plans lock in a price, avoid the need
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New York law made a distinction between deposits given for
different purposes. A deposit given for application towards the
price of the good was forfeit when a buyer breached, creating a
particular problem for layaway plans, but also potentially
applicable to other transactions.89 In contrast, a buyer might
recover a deposit made as security, after satisfaction of damages
owed to the seller for the breach.90 Courts often simply used the
term “deposit” to refer to a deposit made as security and referred
to a deposit made toward the purchase price as a “down” or “part
payment.”91
The theory behind the distinction between a deposit for the
price and a deposit for security was that, by its very nature, a
security deposit was made to satisfy damages, but not more.92 In
practice, courts had difficulty determining the purpose behind
deposits in many cases,93 though not in the case of layaway plans.
Because payment of the price is the very purpose for the layaway
plan, such plans were particularly vulnerable to application of the
common law rule.

for credit, and assure the availability of the product. One niche area where reserving
a product may be important is women’s fashions in which product designs change each
year. A layaway reserves a fashion item that may not be available at a later date. I
am grateful to Professor Francis Hill for this example. However, layaway plans
currently are available at large retailers, such as Walmart, for all types of products,
and with a particular emphasis on Christmas shopping. See Layaway, Returns in
2019. See you then! WALMART (last visited July 19, 2019), https://www.walmart.
com/cp/Layaway/1088466. For general shopping needs, use of a layaway plan may be
a matter of necessity and not of convenience—for example, if a low-income person does
not have access to a credit card. Layaway plans may be subject to specific state or
local legislation. See Offering Layaways, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (last visited
Aug. 25, 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-center/guidance/offeringlayaways#4.
89
Bisner v. Mantell, 92 N.Y.S.2d 825, 827 (City Ct. of Troy 1949) (discussing a
layaway plan).
90
Petito v. Aiello, 181 Misc. 371, 371, 47 N.Y.S.2d 447, 447 (2d Dep’t 1944) (per
curiam).
91

The law is well settled that the only time that a recovery is allowed is when
the money paid in was in the nature of a deposit and not where it was made
as part payment. There can be no question but what the money paid in by
the plaintiff was part payment for the merchandise.
Bisner, 92 N.Y.S.2d at 829.
92
Chaude v. Shepard, 122 N.Y. 397, 402 (1890).
93
STATE OF N.Y., REPORT OF THE LAW REV. COMM'N, S. 50-65, Assemb. 87-65, at
95–98 (1952). See also Amtorg Trading Corp. v. Miehle Prtg. Press & Mfg. Co., 206
F.2d 103, 106 (2d Cir. 1953) (“This attempted distinction between part performance
and a security deposit seems as impractical and unjustified as the Law Revision
Commission states it to be.”).
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As is typical with the common law, applicable legal principles
trailed behind the commercial reality and so, in the evolving
economic world, the common law was failing to deliver just results
when problems arose with layaway plans. Forfeiture of the
deposit occurred even if it provided an unjust enrichment to the
seller.
This outcome posed a particular problem in New York State
because New York courts were slow to recognize equitable actions
to disgorge unjust enrichment.94 To remedy this unjust result, the
New York State legislature had started to consider enacting a
statute to correct the problem prior to 1942. The attempt to amend
the law in 1942 failed, but this effort influenced the draft of an
amendment to the Uniform Sales Act promulgated in 1944 that
would morph into the initial draft of the UCC, as explained
below.95
The drafting problem which creates the possibility of the
additive method interpretation for § 2-718(2) and (3), allowing the
seller to retain a penalty, results from language in the statute
allowing the seller to retain a portion of the deposit equal to twenty
percent or $500 of the purchase price, whichever is smaller. No
issue would arise had the provision simply allowed the seller to
retain an amount equal to its actual damages, but no more.
A proposed amendment to § 2-718 would have simplified the
treatment of liquidated damages and deposits to do exactly that.96
This proposed amendment was advanced in 1999 and continued in
the failed 2003 proposed revision to Article 2, but was ultimately
withdrawn in 201197—the provision providing for a base retention
amount equal to the lesser of twenty percent of the purchase price
94
The allowance of a suit in quasi-contract for a breaching party was uneven
across subject matter areas, appearing prominently in famous early employment cases
such as Britton v. Turner, 6 N.H. 481, 486–88 (1834), though not universally followed,
even in the employment area. See Hansell v. Erickson, 28 Ill. 257, 258–59 (1862).
Professor Patterson discussed Britton v. Turner in his report to the New York Law
Revision Commission, noting it as the minority view and suggesting that it would not
be the common law of New York. See REPORT OF THE LAW REVIEW COMMISSION FOR
1942, supra note 77, at 212–19.
95
See infra text accompanying notes 110–114.
96
Miller, A True Story, supra note 97, at 161.
97
The failure to amend Article 2 has generated much academic commentary. See,
e.g., Fred H. Miller, What Can We Learn from the Failed 2003-2005 Amendments to
UCC Article 2?, 52 S. TEX. L. REV. 471 (2011) [hereinafter Miller, What Can We Learn].
A brief description of proposed amendments to § 2-718 appears in Fred H. Miller’s
Uniform Commercial Code Article 2 on Sales of Goods and the Uniform Law Process:
A True Story of Good v.?, 11 DUQ. BUS. L.J. 143, 161–62 (2009) [hereinafter Miller, A
True Story].

2019]

SOCIAL JUSTICE AND DEPOSIT RETURN

389

and $500 was eliminated in the proposed amendment.98 This
alteration raises a question about the origin of this provision and
its intended purpose: where did it come from? One might surmise
that it had a purpose other than covering actual damages because
covering actual damages is so easy. To answer this conundrum,
we must look to limitations in the common law and drafting
history.
The particular twenty percent formulation as used in New
York was drafted to correct a deficiency in common law damage
calculations, particularly the inability to recover lost profits. A
significant part of the rationale for allowing the seller to retain up
to twenty percent of the purchase price without a showing of actual
damage was the notion that such a retention would accomplish a
form of rough justice, compensating the seller for actual losses,
which might be difficult or impossible for the seller to prove in
court. Central to the set of real but unprovable damages were
damages for lost profits; they were real in commercial reality but
not yet real in a court of law.
The Commission recognized that allowing return of all payments
in excess of actual provable damages resulting from the breach
might be inequitable to the non-defaulting seller. In a number of
situations involving consumer goods, such as automobiles and
refrigerators that are price fixed by the manufacturer, the seller
may be limited to only nominal damages, inasmuch as the
contract and market price of the item at time of default would
necessarily be the same.99 It is clear that the seller has suffered
harm as a result of the default. Either he loses profit on the
goods, or the expense of making the sale to the defaulter or resale
to a new buyer. The solution in price-fixed items rests in
changing the judicial rule for computing standardized damages,
or in allowing the seller to retain a portion of the payment to
indemnify him for the expenditure of time and effort necessitated
by resale. The New York legislature adopted the latter solution,
permitting the seller to retain twenty percent of the contract
price.100
98

See U.C.C. § 2-718 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW. COMM’N 2003) (withdrawn

2011).
99

For completeness, one might add that the contract price and any resale price of
fixed price items would be the same as well. It would be typical for the nondefaulting
seller to resell the goods. Traditional damage theory would have allowed damages
based on a differential between the contract price and the market price, or resale price,
of the good that the defaulting buyer had failed to purchase.
100
Calvin W. Corman, Restitution for Benefits Conferred by Party in Default
Under Sales Contract, 34 TEX. L. REV. 582, 596–97 (1956).
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By allowing a seller to retain up to twenty percent of the
purchase price, the law allowed for the practical recovery of a form
of damages that neither the common law nor statutory law had yet
recognized. The retention of the partial payments thus operated,
albeit imperfectly, to correct for a failure of the law to theorize the
elements of damage in a modern economy. New York Personal
Property Law § 145-a did not place a cap on the absolute dollar
amount which might be retained by the seller.101 The $500 cap
found in the UCC was a later addition.102
Problems with proof of damages explain why, under the law
existing at the time, it was thought necessary to draft a complex
provision rather than a simple one that directed the seller to
return the amount by which the deposit exceeds actual damages.
It is perhaps unsurprising that pre-UCC law did not address the
lost profit damages suffered by a lost volume seller. Until the
development of a modern economy, which produced an
inexhaustible supply of inventory, a seller would not have suffered
a loss if it resold a product for a price equal to or greater than the
price agreed to be paid by the defaulting buyer. Only with the
development of a capitalist system that mass produced large
volumes of inventory did the concept of lost profits emerge as a
significant concern within the legal system. It is these fixed price,
mass-produced commodity-consumer goods which became the
subject of layaway plans after World War I.
The problem with the operation of a twenty-percent holdback
to account for damages not provable under outdated judicial rules
for computing damages in a simpler age is that passage of the UCC
changed the judicial rules for computing standardized damages.
Now, lost profit damages for a volume seller are available under
§ 2-708(2),103 and a broad range of other incidental damages are
available to the seller as well.104 In light of the UCC’s reform of
the judicial rules for computing standardized damages to better
account for seller losses in a modern economy, allowing a twenty
percent holdback to cover damages—in addition to the additional
damages provable following these reforms—risks a double count,
101

N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law, ch. 823, sec. 1, § 145-a, Laws of New York, 823 (1952).
The $500 limitation appeared in the 1944 version of the Uniform Revised Sales
Act from which the UCC’s treatment of liquidated damages and deposits was derived.
See supra note 84.
103
U.C.C. § 2-708(2) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2018).
104
For example, both U.C.C. § 2-708(1) and U.C.C. § 2-708(2) provide that
“incidental damages” be added to any calculation. “Incidental damages” for a seller
are defined in U.C.C. § 2-710 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2018).
102
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in effect creating the premium or penalty resulting from the
additive method. Such a penalty is not needed under current law
to account for actual, but unprovable, damages. Those damages
are now provable under separate sections of the UCC.
Thus, it should be clear that the use of the twenty-percent
formula in New York was not employed for the creation of a
penalty. Unless another rationale can be found for the inclusion
of the twenty percent or $500 formulation in § 2-718(2) of the UCC,
its inclusion would appear to be an error as retention of twenty
percent is no longer needed to compensate the non-defaulting
seller.105
Such a rationale does exist. The twenty percent or $500
formulation in the pre-history of the UCC was used for an entirely
different purpose. It created a safe harbor exempting a small
liquidated damages amount from a reasonableness test.106 The
two different purposes behind the twenty percent—or twenty
percent or $500—formulation helps to understand some of the
confusion found in the language finally adopted.
A.

Legislative History

In 1942, the New York Law Revision Commission
recommended107 amending the New York Personal Property Law
as follows:
§ 145-a. When buyer in default entitled to restitution. 1. Where
the seller fails or refuses to deliver the goods, and is justified
therein by the buyer’s repudiation or default in performance of
the contract, but the buyer has conferred a net benefit on the
seller by the payment of money or the transfer or delivery of
property in part performance, and the net benefit exceeds twenty
per cent of the value of the total performance for which the buyer
is obligated under the contract, the buyer has a right to obtain
restitution for the amount of such net benefit in excess of such
105
In fairness, until interpretation of UCC § 2-708(2) in cases such as Neri
confirmed a volume seller’s entitlement to lost profits, it was not clear that the UCC
had implemented such a complete change in judicial rules for damage computation.
Indeed, strong textual arguments can be made that Neri and its progeny are wrongly
decided. See John M. Breen, The Lost Volume Seller and Lost Profits Under U.C.C. §
2-708(2): A Conceptual and Linguistic Critique, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 779, 780–82, 787,
789–90, 791–92 (1996). Nevertheless, under the conventionally accepted
interpretation, allowing a twenty percent retention to cover lost profits results in a
clear double count in the additive method.
106
Id. at 798.
107
This point was amplified in the Law Revision Commission’s 1943 report. See
REPORT OF THE LAW REVISION COMMISSION FOR 1943, supra note 80, at 9–10.

392

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 93:365

twenty per cent. Net benefit shall be determined by deducting
from the amount of such payment, or the value of the property
transferred or delivered, the amount or value of the benefits, if
any, received by the buyer or a third party beneficiary by reason
of the contract, and the amount of the damages to which the seller
is entitled by reason of the buyer’s default.108

There are several things to note about this simply drafted
proposal. Proposed § 145-a is an additive methodology, as we saw
in Gongora, Feinberg, and McCann. Damages suffered by the
seller reduce the amount of restitution owed to a defaulting
buyer—by reducing the net benefit received by the seller—which
is arithmetically equivalent to the simple addition of the damages
amount to a fixed twenty percent of the purchase price. This is
because the proposed language contemplates that the seller retain
twenty percent no matter what the circumstances.109 If we adopt
the fiction that twenty percent of the purchase price represents
actual but unprovable lost profits present in every case, then the
addition of other provable damages to reduce “net benefits” will
not result in double counting or overpayment. Further, it is
significant that the proposed amendment did not attempt to
address, in any way, the treatment of agreements to liquidate
damages.
Nevertheless, New York did not enact the proposed
amendment in 1942, and thus did not enact the “net benefit”
formulation of the rule. It was, however, the motivation for the
treatment of deposits in the revision to the Uniform Sales Act. In
late 1941, The Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws met in Indianapolis. This meeting generated a report and a
second draft of The Revised Uniform Sales Act.110 That draft

108
REPORT OF THE LAW REVISION COMMISSION FOR 1942, supra note 77, at 185
(1942). A note explained: “Its purpose is to modify the harshness of the existing rule
under which the buyer loses all and at the same time afford to the seller a measure of
reasonable protection against default by the buyer.” Id. The proposal reappeared in
the next year's report under the section Acts and Recommendation relating to Recovery
for Benefits Conferred by Party in Default under Contract. REPORT OF THE LAW
REVISION COMMISSION FOR 1943, supra note 80, at 19, 23 (1943).
109
REPORT OF THE LAW REVISION COMMISSION FOR 1943, supra note 80, at
23 (1943).
110
REPORT AND SECOND DRAFT, THE REVISED UNIFORM SALES ACT (1944),
reprinted in 1 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE DRAFTS (Elizabeth Slusser Kelly
ed. 1984).
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tackled the same problem addressed by proposed § 145-a in New
York, but it did so using very different language. It proposed a
new § 64111 that provided, in relevant part, as follows:
Section 64. (New to Sales Act.) Liquidated Damages and
Deposits.
(1)(a) The particularized terms of the contract may fix liquidated
damages for breach by either party in any amount which is not
unreasonable. In estimating what is reasonable, the court may
take into account the delay and inconvenience actually caused by
the breach, or incident to remedy, as well as the difficulty in proof
of damage and the convenience of administration of remedy.
(b) A clause fixing an unreasonable amount as agreed damage is
a penalty, and void.
(2)(a) Any down or part payment, or “deposit”, made upon a
contract to sell or a sale, is deemed to be made for security and
shall in the event of breach by the buyer be limited to serving as
security. This subsection applies, whether or not such payment
or deposit is agreed to be applied upon the price, and irrespective
of any provision for its forfeiture, and whether it is in the form of
money, check, goods, or otherwise.112

In the comments to new Section 64, specific reference is made
to the New York Law Revision Commission’s bill on the matter of
sales of goods, simply stating that “[t]he better cases have refused
to follow the view that a contract-breaker is barred from all
remedy by the mere fact of breach.”113 Section 64 had no
antecedents in the Uniform Sales Act of 1906, the proposed
Federal sales act, or the first draft of the Revised Uniform Sales
Act issued in 1940.114 The difference in the drafting approaches
taken by New York State’s law revision commission and the
NCCUSL, under the direction of Llewellyn, were stark.
In proposed new Section 64, any down or part payment, or
“deposit,” is treated as “security.”115 As security, it would be
applied to cover actual damages and not a penalty. A premium
would only be possible if the contract fixed liquidated damages,
and then only at a reasonable level. A comment makes clear that
whether the agreed measure of damages is reasonable within this
section is a question for the court.116
111
112
113
114
115
116

Id. at 557–58.
Id. at 557.
Id. at 558.
Id. at 280 (Finder and Table of Comparable Sections).
Id. at 557–58.
Id. at 558.
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This drafting approach both confronts and uses the New York
common law distinction between a payment for the price and a
security deposit. By deeming all deposits—whether made for the
price or as security—to have been made as security, the language
would require payment of restitution for any amount by which the
deposit exceeded damages.
Additionally, there is no equivalent of a base retention
amount—no twenty percent to which a non-defaulting seller is
entitled without question or calculation. There is no cumulative
or additive “net benefit” formulation at all. The explanation for
this distinction rests with the difference in purposes behind the
New York legislative effort and the revisions to the Uniform Sales
Act.
The motivation in New York was to correct a very specific
inconsistency and not to create a more general reform of contract
law or even damage theory. In contrast, the revision of the
Uniform Sales Act was designed to reform and modernize the
entirety of sales law, including remedies. Thus, using language in
the revised Uniform Sales Act that treated all deposits as security
did not risk undercompensating the nondefaulting seller. The
nondefaulting seller would be taken care of by the modernized
Uniform Sales Act which would create all the damage remedies
needed in the industrialized economy.
Furthermore, the revised Uniform Sales Act addresses
liquidated damages as well as deposit returns in the same section,
an important addition, though one that introduces added
complexity. In the Uniform Revised Sales Act draft of 1944, we
find § 124. It reads, in relevant part, as follows:
(1) Damages for breach by either party may be liquidated in the
agreement but only at an amount which is reasonable in light of
the anticipated or actual harm caused by the breach, the
difficulties of proof of loss, and the inconvenience or nonfeasibility of otherwise obtaining an adequate remedy. A term
fixing unreasonably large liquidated damages is void as a
penalty.
(2) A “deposit” or “down” or part payment of more than 20 per
cent of the price or $500, whichever is smaller, made as security
and to be forfeited on breach, is so forfeited only to the extent that
it is a reasonable liquidation of damages . . . .117

117
UNIFORM REVISED SALES ACT (Sales Chapter of Proposed Commercial Code),
Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 75–76 (AM. LAW INST. Apr. 27, 1944) reprinted in 2
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE DRAFTS (Elizabeth Slusser Kelly ed. 1984). The Uniform
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Note that this draft appears to take a step backwards in coverage
from the prior proposed § 64 considered in 1942. On its face, § 124
addresses liquidated damages only and not the more general case
of a deposit in the absence of a liquidated damages specification.
This drafting is not additive or cumulative because all it does is
create a safe harbor for retention of a deposit in an amount up to
twenty percent or $500, whichever is smaller, but only if the
deposit was “made as security and to be forfeited on breach.”118 If
the proposed retention of the deposit is larger than this small
amount, then it can only be retained or not “forfeited” to the extent
that it is “a reasonable liquidation of damages.”119 Thus, the early
drafting attempts in the UCC history use the twenty-percent or
$500 formulation to test a liquidated damages clause, the situation
now addressed by § 2-718(1) and not the circumstances of
§ 2-718(2) and (3).
In operation, this clause exempts the retention of small dollar
amounts from the requirement that retention of the small amount
be a reasonable liquidation of damages evaluated by a court. If
the amount is small enough, it may be retained even if it is a
penalty insofar as it allows recovery of an amount in excess of
actual damages. One might imagine the drafters were motivated
by considerations of efficiency by not allowing parties to litigate
the question of whether retention of a small amount constituted a
“reasonable liquidation of damages.”
When contrasted with the current version of § 2-718, the scope
of the early formulation is much broader. Subsection (1) of the
current § 2-718 is the provision which addresses those agreements
which contain a liquidated damages amount. There, no liquidated
amount may function as a penalty. In theory, a court might
examine even small amounts at risk. Subsection (2)(b) of the
current § 2-718 addresses a wholly different situation, in which a
deposit is made for some unspecified reason—security, evidence of
ability to pay, seriousness of intent to complete a transaction, and
so forth—but the contract is silent on liquidated damages. The
draft of § 124 did not address this situation at all.

Commercial Code project began as proposals to revise the Uniform Sales Act. See
Robert Braucher, supra note 85, at 799–800.
118
UNIFORM REVISED SALES ACT (Sales Chapter of Proposed Commercial Code),
Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 76 (AM. LAW INST. Apr. 27, 1944) reprinted in 2 UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE DRAFTS (Elizabeth Slusser Kelly ed. 1984).
119
Id.
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Section 124 remained the same in what appears to be a
subsequent confidential version of the draft sales law prepared no
earlier than 1945.120 By 1950, the drafts of the revised sales law
had morphed into the UCC and started to resemble the now
familiar structure of Article 2. In the 1950 version, § 2-720
addressed the liquidation or limitation of damages and deposits.121
Even though the form and numbering of the sales law had been
reworked, the language remained identical to that of the original
proposed § 124. However, the 1950 version of the Code, for the
first time, includes a brief comment which tries to explain the
purpose of the twenty percent or $500 formulation.122 It briefly
states:
Subsection (2) refuses to recognize a forfeiture unless the amount
of the payment so forfeited represents a reasonable liquidation of
damages as determined under subsection (1). A special exception
is made in the case of small amounts (20% of the price or $500,
whichever is smaller) deposited as security. No distinction is
made between cases in which the payment is to be applied on the
price and those in which it is intended as security for
performance. Subsection (2) is applicable to any deposit or down
or part payment.123

Even though the text of the proposed law seems to be limited
in its application to a deposit that “is to be forfeited on
breach”—that is, to a deposit for which an agreement as to
liquidated damages has been reached—at some point, the drafters
intended to give the clause broader applicability by having it apply
to any deposit or down payment or part payment.124 It appears
120
DRAFT UNIFORM REVISED SALES ACT reprinted in 2 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE CONFIDENTIAL DRAFTS 88 (Kelly & Puckett eds. 1995) (noting draft was not
prepared prior to 1945).
121
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT, TEXT AND COMMENT
EDITION 267–68 (AM. LAW INST. & NCCUSL 1950); U.C.C. § 2-720 (Am. Law Inst. &
NCCUSL 1950).
122
Compare id. with DRAFT UNIFORM REVISED SALES ACT, reprinted in 2
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE CONFIDENTIAL DRAFTS 88 (Kelly & Puckett eds. 1995).
123
U.C.C. § 2-720 cmt. 2 (AM. LAW INST. & NCCUSL 1950) (emphasis added).
124
This drafting quirk was noted by Professor Patterson in his written evaluation
of the Uniform Commercial Code for the New York Law Revision Commission. STATE
OF NEW YORK, 1 LAW REVISION COMMISSION REPORT, STUDY OF THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE 705 (1955). A propensity to change the meaning of statutory
language in a comment was commonplace. See Erwin Surrency, Research in the
Uniform Commercial Code, 1962 U. ILL. L.F. 404, 408; Robert Braucher, Report on
Article 2–Sales by Certain Members of the Faculty of the Harvard Law School, 6 BUS.
LAW 151, 152–3 (1951); The Uniform Commercial Code: Major Differences Between
Massachusetts and Pennsylvania, 71 HARV. L. REV. 679, 686 (1958).
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that, in 1950, the drafters of the UCC recognized that, when the
drafting moved from § 64 to § 124 in the revised Uniform Sales
Act, protection for some deposits had been inadvertently lost in
translation. Despite the limiting language, the idea all along was
to protect all deposits by treating them as made for security.
The 1957 version gave express operative effect to the idea that
the section should apply to any deposit in § 2-718, which governs
liquidation or limitation of damages and deposits.125
The
numbering and form of the section remained the same in the 1958
version, including the comment which originally appeared in 1950,
albeit a comment describing a differently drafted section.126 No
change was made in the 1962 version to § 2-718 or the relevant
comment.127 Section 2-718 remains today the same as it appeared
in 1962.128
Some “post” legislative history from the withdrawn attempt to
amend Article 2 provides some idea of how the drafting
institutions viewed § 2-718.129 A Reporter’s Note to revised Article
2 in 1999 characterized current subsection (b) as a “statutory
liquidated damages” clause:
[Reporter’ s Note – Subsection (b) also drops the statutory
liquidated damages clause that operates in the absence of an
express liquidated damages provision. In the current law, this
provides that “in the absence of such terms, twenty per cent of
the value of the total performance for which the buyer is obligated
under the contract or $500, whichever is smaller.”]130
125
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, 1957 OFFICIAL EDITION, 62–63 (Am. Law Inst.
& Unif. Law Comm’n 1957).
126
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, 1958 OFFICIAL TEXT WITH COMMENTS, 212–13
(Am. Law Inst. & Unif. Law Comm’n 1958).
127
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, 1962 OFFICIAL TEXT WITH COMMENTS, 213–15
(Am. Law Inst. & Unif. Law Comm’n 1962).
128
UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED, MASTER EDITION, VOLUME 1C, UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE, 642–43 (2012).
129
Use of failed revised Article 2 as a resource to interpret the existing Article 2
is endorsed in the literature. See David Frisch, Amended U.C.C Article 2 as Code
Commentary, 11 DUQ. BUS. L.J. 175, 177 (2009); accord Hawkland at § 2-718:3 (noting
that “[i]n 2011, the [ULC and ALI] withdrew . . . the amendments to Article
2 . . . . These proposed amendments may help inform interpretation and application
of current law”). The retrospective does provide insights here, despite the
metaphysical oddity of explaining a prior event by reference to a later event. It might
be justified by observing that the later comments nevertheless took place within the
same interpretive community—namely, the ALI and the ULC. It does shed light on
how these two institutions viewed their own prior work product.
130
See DISCUSSION DRAFT, REVISION OF UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ARTICLE
2—SALES, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS 112
(Dec. 1999).
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Characterization of § 2-718(b) as a “statutory liquidated damages
clause” is significant. A liquidated damages clause operates in lieu
of a traditional damages calculation—not in addition to it.
Once a liquidated damage clause has been shown to be part of
the agreement, it represents the exclusive remedy available to
the aggrieved party, who may not seek other damages or other
legal remedies. This was the well settled rule at common law and
is almost certainly the rule under section 2-718.131

The characterization of § 2-718(2)(b) as a statutory liquidated
damages clause for those who did not draft one does not support
the additive method. Rather, it supports the alternative approach
of Neri and the context sensitive method recommended here.
In the 2003 version of the Amendments to § 2-718(3), the
commentary
was
changed
to
read:
“The
statutory
liquidated-damages deduction from the breaching buyer’s
restitution remedy has also been eliminated.”132 This comment
was in line with viewing the twenty percent or $500 formulation
as a form of statutory liquidated damages, though it does not
explicitly state that the provision was intended to function in place
of an express liquidated damages clause.
B. How Should This Legislative History Be Evaluated?
Notably, the drafting process of the UCC involved two distinct
and influential groups, amongst others: “Downtown” or Wall
Street business lawyers in New York City, who either participated
in, or were familiar with, the New York Law Revision Commission
process to fix the asymmetry between treatment of defaulting
sellers and defaulting buyers; and “uptown,” or academic lawyers,
primarily at Columbia Law School, led by Karl Llewellyn, who
undertook efforts to revise the Uniform Sales Act, which morphed

131
Roy Ryden Anderson, Liquidated Damages under the Uniform Commercial
Code, 41 SW. L.J. 1083, 1104 (1987).
132
UNIFORM
LAWS
ANNOTATED,
UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL
CODE
APPENDIX-ARTICLE 2. SALES (Am. Law Inst. & Unif. Law Comm’n 2003) (Amendments
Proposed in 2003 and Withdrawn from the Official Text in 2011).
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into the UCC.133 Section 2-718 is a product of drafting efforts and
compromise between these two different groups with overlapping
but still distinct concerns and experiences.
A review of the drafting process indicates that none of the
antecedents to current § 2-718(2) and (3) were aimed at providing
a penalty or a premium to a non-defaulting seller. At most, in New
York, the retention of twenty percent was designed to strike a fair
balance by allowing the nondefaulting seller to retain something
for his troubles.134
Under the enacted amendment to New York Personal
Property Law § 145-a, the retention of a deposit equal to twenty
percent of the purchase price might inadvertently result in
overcompensation to a nondefaulting seller; however, this outcome
was not its aim.135 Section 145-a, like its “net benefits” precursor
in 1942, simply included the twenty percent retention rate as a
quick fix to correct a common law deficiency with the calculation
of damages. The downtown lawyers used the base retention
amount idea to avoid undercompensation for nondefaulting
sellers. They opted for a quick fix because reforming the law of
damages was not their charge. Instead, their narrow task was to
provide restitution to defaulting buyers.
As for the revised Uniform Sales Act process, initially the
uptown lawyers wanted a modern law, so when they became aware
of the problems associated with restitution of deposits with which
New York was struggling, they wanted to counter the archaic
common law distinction between a part payment and a security
deposit.136 However, they were not worried about shortcomings in
the common law theory of damage recovery because, as part of

133
See Allen R. Kamp, Downtown Code: A History of the Uniform Commercial
Code 1949-1954, 49 BUFF. L. REV. 359 (2001); Allen R. Kamp, Uptown Act: A History
of the Uniform Commercial Code: 1940-49, 51 S.M.U. L. REV. 275 (1998). For a general
overview of the drafting process, see William A. Schnader, A Short History of the
Preparation and Enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code, 22 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 1 (1967).
134
See REPORT OF THE LAW REVISION COMMISSION FOR 1943, supra note 80, at
19–23; accord 1 LAW REVISION COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 124, at 704
(describing New York’s twenty-percent retention as compensation for risk, incidental
expenses, the burden of making a deal, and being ready to perform). Significantly, in
comparing the proposed UCC and New York law, Professor Patterson noted that in
New York, a seller was not required to prove the elements of damage—which, after
all, was the very point of the twenty percent formulation. Id. at 704–05.
135
Id. at 704–05.
136
Kamp, supra note 133, at 371.
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their process, they were drafting the damages rules that would
govern.137 No base retention amount was needed as a quick fix for
the uptown lawyers.
Another consideration was at play here; the uptown lawyers
were not very interested in problems associated with restitution of
deposits. They did not identify the problem—it was not their
“baby”—but they were prepared to address it. Karl Llewellyn and
the other uptown lawyers were very interested in problems of
unconscionability, reasonableness, good faith, and the like,138 and
they were interested in the treatment of liquidated damages
clauses because of the interplay with these concepts. They were
interested in questions such as the following: when should a court
refuse to enforce a liquidated damages clause for being
unreasonable or for being unconscionable? Should a court test for
reasonableness only at the execution of the contract or again, later,
at the time of default? Is proposing a penalty related to bad faith?
The questions were interesting.139 Additionally, interwoven into
the mix were considerations about judicial economy.140 After all, a
liquidated damages clause is used to avoid a damages
calculation—and thus eliminate the need for judicial time—but
little or nothing is saved if consideration of a damages calculation
is simply replaced by consideration of whether the liquidated

137

Id. at 372.
See, e.g., Richard Danzig, A Comment on the Jurisprudence of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 27 STAN L. REV. 621, 627–30 (1975) (discussing the UCC’s use of
concepts such as commercial reasonableness, good faith, and unconscionability);
Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code—The Emperor’s New Clause, 115
U. PA. L. REV. 485 (1967); Imad D. Abyad, Note, Commercial Resonableness in Karl
Llewellyn’s Uniform Commercial Code Jurisprudence, 83 VA. L. REV. 429 (1997). See
generally WILLIAM TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT 291,
360 (2d ed. 2012).
139
Retesting a liquidated damages amount after the time of contract formation
caused a great deal of consternation. See STATE OF NEW YORK, 1 LAW REVISION
COMMISSION REPORT, STUDY OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 580–82,
704 (1955).
140
Llewellyn favored rules and practices that had a positive effect of saving costs,
such as by providing clarity and avoiding litigation, and he recognized the role of a
cost-benefit form of analysis. See Karl Llewellyn, What Price Contract? An Essay in
Perspective, 40 YALE L.J. 704, 724 n.45 (1931) (raising the idea that sometimes the
speed of judicial administration outweighs the chance of injustice to the litigants). He
was interested in standardized contracts because “[t]hey materially ease and cheapen
selling and distribution.” Id. at 731. Llewellyn criticized opponents of the UCC by
stating: “[they] do not seem to understand a balance sheet.” Karl N. Llewellyn,
Statement to the Law Revision Commission, A Simple Case on Behalf of the Code,
NEW YORK LAW REVISION COMM’N, RECORD OF HEARINGS ON THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE 27 (1954) reprinted in TWINING, supra note 138, at 586, 597.
138
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damages amount should be enforced. The purpose of the formula,
in the hands of the uptown lawyers, was to relieve a court from
having to test small amounts for reasonableness, or so it seems.141
To the extent one can look to the “deep background” motives of
Karl Llewellyn and the other uptown lawyers, this was not a case
in which the UCC was attempting to overturn the general contract
law presumption against premiums or penalties.
The difference in focus and in the tasks appointed for the
uptown lawyers and the downtown lawyers explains why, when
the revised Uniform Sales Act progressed from § 64 to § 124, the
twenty percent or $500 formulation remained but was used for the
entirely different purpose of creating a liquidated damages safe
harbor. Literally, in this transition, protection for an ordinary
deposit was dropped entirely. What is completely clear, again, is
that initial use of the twenty percent or $500 formula by the
uptown lawyers was not aimed at providing for a penalty or a
premium.
Rather, the formula was used to render enforceable—without
a reasonableness test—a prior agreement on payment of an
amount that might result in a penalty but only as a byproduct of
foregoing the reasonableness test. When the uptown lawyers
previously focused on problems specific to restitution of deposits
in § 64, no formula was used; instead, all deposits were treated as
having been made as “security.”142
The drafting complexity arose when the uptown lawyers
introduced the formula for one purpose, and then repositioned it
for another purpose later in the drafting process. In the final
drafting of the UCC, the twenty percent or $500 formulation
ceased to be a safe harbor to protect express liquidated damages
clauses. Rather, it morphed into a statutory liquidated damages
clause, covering small amounts, for those parties who had not
agreed to liquidated damages.143
However, this statutory
liquidated damages clause had an odd “heads I win, tails you lose”
quality. A nondefaulting seller could accept the statutory
liquidated damages amount when convenient; however, unlike a
traditional liquidated damages clause, the nondefaulting seller
141
No comment was included on § 124 to the Uniform Revised Sales Act when it
was first introduced. See DRAFT UNIFORM REVISED SALES ACT, reprinted in 2
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE CONFIDENTIAL DRAFTS 88 (Kelly & Puckett eds. 1995).
142
See supra text accompanying note 115.
143
This is why the later annotations and comments to the UCC refer to subsection
(2)(b) as statutory liquidated damages.
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was not bound by, or limited to, collection of that amount if greater
damages might be proved. This structure was needed when the
$500 cap was introduced. Had the statutory liquidated damages
amount simply been set at twenty percent, one might have
attempted to limit nondefaulting sellers to that amount.144
This analysis shows that there is no historical basis to
interpret UCC § 2-718(2) and (3) as a case in which the drafters of
the UCC made an exception to allow for a penalty or a premium.145
Accordingly, UCC § 1-305 should not be used to justify application
of the additive method for interpretation of § 2-718(2) and (3).
Moreover, the legislative history review discloses nothing to
challenge the conclusion that courts should apply the context
sensitive method advanced in Part III.146 Indeed, the narrative
strengthens the conviction that the context sensitive method of
computation is correct.
To summarize the results so far, Gongora, Feinberg, and
McCann were wrongly decided and are not simply cases of courts
ignoring the binding precedent of Neri. Neri was correctly decided
on the substantive outcome, but wrong in the details of its
statutory construction—perhaps a case of no harm, no foul. UCC
§ 2-718(2) and (3) should be applied, to the extent possible, to
provide for actual damage recovery and no more. In cases where
the nondefaulting seller’s damages are less than the base retention
amount, the odd statutory liquidated damages clause must be
given effect in deference to the statutory language and to
legislative history suggesting the intent to create a statutory
liquidated damages clause. Homage to the statutory language
means that some nondefaulting sellers will be overcompensated in
small amounts, but that seems to be the point of the language
because the statute strikes a balance, tolerating a modest bit of
unjust enrichment in exchange for judicial economy in small cases.

144
Such an effort at substantive regulation might well have failed, however.
While the original UCC drafting process contemplated a fair amount of substantive
regulation, over time substantive regulation was replaced with an emphasis on
default rules to be used in the absence of agreement.
145
See U.C.C. § 1-305(a) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2018) (“The
remedies provided by [the Uniform Commercial Code] must be liberally administered
to the end that the aggrieved party may be put in as good a position as if the other
party had fully performed but neither consequential or special damages nor penal
damages may be had except as specifically provided in [the Uniform Commercial
Code] or by other rule of law.”).
146
See supra notes 57–71 and accompanying text.
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V. THE MULTIPLYING EFFECTS OF A “SMALL
CALCULATION QUIBBLE”
The “penalty” interpretation of § 2-718(2) and (3) has the
potential for causing widespread difficulties in the populace. The
problem cries out for a correction for four reasons.
A.

Summary of Reasons to Care About the Problem

First, proposed changes to the UCC that would have fixed the
problem were withdrawn by the ALI and the ULC. This problem
has had a solution since at least 1999.147 Stewardship of the law
requires follow-through to insure the law produces a just result,
particularly for those of modest means, once a case of injustice is
identified.
Second, the penalty interpretation of UCC § 2-718(2) and
(3) serves no countervailing purpose, particularly in light of the
interpretation’s potential to adversely impact large numbers of
persons. Imposing a penalty in the absence of any justification
whatsoever is unreasonable. Some might argue a cautious
interpretation of a provision such as § 2-718 because it does, in
some cases, result in an overcompensation mandated by statute
without even the fig leaf of the agreement of the parties on a
liquidated amount. Llewellyn captured this idea best when he
said, “where the reason stops there stops the rule.”148 Indeed,
economic theory disfavors enforcement of penalties because
penalties discourage efficient breaches in which social utility is
increased.149 To be sure, one might keep the twenty percent or
$500 formulation for the purpose of judicial economy—resulting in
a small amount of overcompensation—to discourage litigation over
small amounts, but there is no justification when damages exceed
the base retention amount. Stewardship of the law requires
prudence to err on the side of caution.
Third, the penalty interpretation may cause actual harm by
creating a prevailing sense that the legal system produces unfair
results, particularly among the large percentage of the population
who face economic hardships.
Misapplication of the law
contributes in a case like this, at least in a small way, to a
147

A draft amendment to Article 2 was first approved in 1999.
See TWINING, supra note 138, at 210.
149
See, e.g., Lake River Corp. v. Carborundum Co., 769 F.2d 1284, 1289 (1985)
(Posner, J.). An efficient breach creates a Pareto optimal outcome. See Larry A.
Dimatteo, A Theory of Efficient Penalty: Eliminating the Law of Liquidated Damages,
38 AM. BUS. L.J. 633, 636–37 (2001).
148
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breakdown in respect for the rule of law. This issue is a problem
for a statute like the UCC, which is drafted to rely on open-ended
and general standards, such as good faith, reasonableness, and
unconscionability. The structure of the UCC already requires
courts to engage in ad hoc reasoning, which is difficult to fit within
general rules.150 When general standards of a law are applied in
such a way that it results in an unjust outcome, confidence in the
law is jeopardized. Individuals have no reason to trust the
application of general principles when the law gets the details so
very wrong. Stewardship of the law requires taking steps to
strengthen respect for the rule of law, not senselessly sowing
random seeds of discontent.151
Fourth, the law has an expressive function by reflecting a
society’s values.152 In these economic times, with problems of
growing income inequality, the law should not express the
retrograde idea that a nondefaulting seller is allowed to retain
premiums or penalties out of a defaulting buyer’s deposits,
particularly without any countervailing reason justifying a
penalty; naked unjust enrichment will not suffice as a rationale.
Concern over the expressive message of the law is always
paramount. Stewardship of the law requires ensuring that the law
conveys a message that appeals to the good of society.
B. Evaluation of Social Science Data Supporting the Need for a
Change and the Difficulties Assessing the Scope of the
Problem
Studies show that many Americans live paycheck to
paycheck153 and would have trouble making an unexpected $500
payment—the very amount of the maximum computation error at

150
Employing words like “reasonable” in a statute invites ad hoc reasoning. “The
word reasonable, effective in small doses, has been administered by the bucket,
leaving the corpus of the Code reeling in dizzy confusion.” David Mellinkoff, The
Language of the Uniform Commercial Code, 77 Yale L.J. 185, 185–86 (1967). See
generally ROBERTO UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY 197 (1976) (discussing problems
with general rules).
151
Cf. ROBERTO M. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS 84 (1975) (“[T]o be
effective as a means of order, the laws must deserve and win the allegiance of the
citizenry.”).
152
See generally Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA.
L. REV. 2021 (1996).
153
Quentin Fottrell, Half of US Working Families Are Living Paycheck to
Paycheck, N.Y. POST (Apr. 5, 2017, 2:46 P.M), http://nypost.com/2017/04/05/half-of-usworking-families-are-living-paycheck-to-paycheck/.
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issue in these cases.154 A study published in 2015 found that
twenty-five percent of families had less than $400 in savings.155
More broadly, in 2017, forty percent of adults report that they or
their families had trouble meeting at least one basic need for food,
health care, housing, or utilities.156 Similarly, over twenty percent
of Americans report they have no retirement savings.157
Therefore, what some might minimize as a small calculation
quibble is actually not a small amount for a significant portion of
the population. While there is a lack of case law regarding this
issue, the absence of court decisions could very well be reflective
of the high transaction costs that keep most cases from being
litigated. When the policy cannot be supported by data, those
associated with law reform should consider avoidance of corrosive
impacts as a matter of reasonable system design. People lose
respect for a legal system that produces results that treat them
unfairly.
Some might argue that this data, standing alone, do not show
a problem widespread enough to merit attention. The response is
complex and requires an appeal to structural observations about
how the legal system itself can mask the importance of underlying
social problems.
It is unrealistic to assume that the legal system itself, through
a simple count of publicly available decisions, reveals the full
extent of injustices occurring in the real world. Examination of
case law serves as an imperfect window into matters of societal
concern. Given the small amounts at stake in any individual case,
scant lawyer or judicial time will be spent analyzing and correcting
for an easy and straightforward—though wrong—application of
the statute.
Transaction costs alone explain why individual cases in this
area receive little attention. Significantly, the UCC does not
provide for recovery of attorney fees or penalty judgments to
induce private attorneys to function in the public interest in lieu

154

McGrath, supra note 3.
THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, supra note 4, at 6 (“The typical household has
$3,800 in liquid savings, but a quarter of households have more than $17,000, and
another quarter has less than $400.”).
156
MICHAEL KARPMAN ET AL., supra note 5.
157
1 in 3 Americans Have Less Than $5,000 in Retirement Savings, THE
NORTHWESTERN MUTUAL LIFE INS. COMPANY (May 8, 2018), https://news.north
westernmutual.com/2018-05-08-1-In-3-Americans-Have-Less-Than-5-000-InRetirement-Savings.
155
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of a state actor.158 Moreover, the UCC does not contain class action
provisions, which might operate to aggregate small individual
claims into a single matter of sufficient size to attract the attention
of private attorneys.159 Even if the UCC contained class action
provisions, individualized consideration of transaction damages
would not satisfy traditional requirements for class certification in
deposit return cases.
Further, many cases in which this problem is addressed may
never become decisions that are available and easily accessed
through Lexis or Westlaw. Many consumers victimized by an
excessive retention of a deposit probably never bring a lawsuit.
Even if a lawsuit is brought, the case may settle. If the case goes
to judgment, that judgment may not result in a written order of
decision published in an electronic database. The publicly
available decisions merely suggest a deeper problem that
traditional social science data fails to identify directly.
Nevertheless, this argument has a foundational basis: (1) a large
segment of the population may be adversely impacted by an
incorrect application of the law; (2) those affected will include
low-income individuals, without access to credit, for whom a $500
loss is significant; and (3) retaining a penalty creates an unjust
enrichment. The best course in such a case is for the steward of
law to err on the side of caution and make the correction.
C. The Problem of Design Failures
Recognition that the structure of the UCC itself, and the
process for its amendment, jointly operate to disadvantage lower
income groups, among others, creates a call for action. The power
structure created the problem with the drafting of the law, and the
power structure has an amendment process ill-suited to clean up
after its mistakes. The reality runs counter to the conventional,
and often incorrect, view of statutes. On the conventional view, a
court aims to implement legislative will when interpreting a
158
See Caroline Edwards, Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code and
Consumer Protection: The Refusal to Experiment, 78 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 663, 668,
717–18 (2004). Indeed, the expense of filing a small claims case itself might function
as a deterrent to bringing suit in the first instance. In Miami-Dade County, Florida,
for example, the filing fee is a sliding scale that can be as much as $300. Additional
fees are required for issuance of a summons and service of process by a sheriff. See
Small Claims Court – How to File a Claim, HARVEY RUVIN CLERK OF THE COURTS,
MIAMI-DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA, http://www.miami-dadeclerk.com/property_small_
claims.asp (last visited July 31, 2019).
159
Edwards, supra note 158, at 720.
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statute, and when a court produces an incorrect result, it can
easily be remedied by statutory amendment.160 The problem
arises when a non-majoritarian decision of consequence is not
merely transitory. Stewardship of the law requires correction of
these design failures.
1.

Design Failure Number 1: UCC Operating Like a Civil
Law System

Examining the case law, particularly the disconnect between
Neri and the later New York State cases, leads to conjecture about
how this area of law operates. The theory is that, at least in an
area of the law constrained by transaction costs, our legal system,
and particularly statutes like the UCC, operates much more like a
traditional civil law system than like a common law system.161 The
UCC, though a statute, was not designed to work like a traditional
civil code.162 A traditional civil law system is a system in which
the mode of analysis relies on the reading of a code or a statute,
largely in isolation, divorced from the consideration of precedents
and, perhaps, other secondary materials.163 In such a system, a
premium is placed on clear drafting and straightforward
application of statutory language, which § 2-718 lacks.164
An ambiguity differs from an open or general term. The claim
is not made here that the drafters of the UCC intentionally created
ambiguities, like that found in § 2-718.165 The drafters did,
however, intentionally use open and general terms which
160
See Harry H. Wellington, The Nature of Judicial Review, 91 YALE. L.J. 486,
487 (1982) (noting the conventional view and its shortcomings).
161
Weiss, supra note 9.
162
It is generally accepted that the UCC is not designed to be a classical civil law
code. See John E. Murray, Jr., Revised Article 2: Eliminating the “Battle” and
Unconscionability, 52 S. TEX. L.R. 593, 594 (2011). It is sometimes called a “common
law code” because it allows and depends on case law development. Id. See also
Caroline N. Brown, Restoring Peace in the Battle of the Forms: A Framework for
Making Uniform Commercial Code Section 2-207 Work, 69 N.C. L. REV. 893 (1991)
(“The drafters envisioned Article 2 as a fabric of statutory law that takes its essential
character from its framework of common law and commercial reality”); Lewis A.
Grossman, Langdell Upside-Down: James Coolidge Carter and the Anticlassical
Jurisprudence of Anticodification, 19 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 149, 215–16 (2007).
163
Weiss, supra note 9.
164
A literal reading of Article 2 often is not possible; rather, one comes to
understand Article 2’s meaning only after appreciation of its purposes. See generally
Eugene F. Mooney, Old Kontract Principles and Karl's New Kode: An Essay on the
Jurisprudence of Our New Commercial Law, 11 VILL. L. REV. 213, 219–21 (1966).
165
The most famous UCC drafting ambiguity appears in § 2-207, which addresses
the “battle of the forms.” This ambiguity also was addressed in revised Article 2. See
Murray, supra note 162, at 601.
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anticipated later court involvement in the ongoing development of
commercial law.166 Indeed, the UCC depends upon case law
development to flesh out open terms like “reasonable” and
“unconscionable” to fill gaps and adapt to changing commercial
practices.167
The UCC’s system design depends on significant ex post
examination. Llewellyn was explicit about the need for court
involvement:
Technical language and complex statement cannot be wholly
avoided. But they can be reduced to a minimum. The essential
presupposition of so reducing them is faith in the courts to give
reasonable effect to reasonable intention of the language.
Semi-permanent Acts must envisage and must encourage
development by the courts.168

This set-up created the environment in which a lower value
was placed on language precision because any ambiguities would
be addressed as a byproduct of the expected court involvement in
applying open and general terms. Moreover, another UCC design
feature devalued statutory drafting precision. By agreement,
parties may vary most UCC provisions.169
Recognition of
contractual freedom allows parties to simply contract around
drafting problems in the statutory language. In contrast, a civil
code places a greater premium on drafting precision both because
its terms are not applied against a backdrop of precedent and
because more of its provisions are mandatory.170
In the realm of the low dollar case, however, the text of the
statute assumes a primacy not present in larger cases. If the
parties and the court do not have the resources to consult the case
law or to reflect on the intricacies of the drafting, the system
envisioned for the proper functioning of the UCC breaks down. If

166
The drafters trusted courts to sensibly apply general terms to specific
circumstances. Miller, A True Story, supra note 97, at 144 n.6 (2009).
167
See Miller, What Can We Learn, supra note 97, at 471–72.
168
Memorandum from Karl N. Llewellyn to the Executive Committee on Scope
and Program, National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Re:
Possible Uniform Commercial Code, reprinted in TWINING, supra note 138, at 580, 582
(emphasis in original).
169
UCC § 1-302(a) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2018).
170
Weiss, supra note 9. In contrast, the drafting of Article 2 often is criticized.
See, e.g., William H. Henning, Amended Article 2: What Went Wrong?, 11 DUQ. BUS.
L.J. 131 (2009) (describing the drafting of original Article 2 as “confusing and
even sloppy”).
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this conjecture is correct, it provides support for a statutory
amendment as the solution, as this Article argues, rather than
other corrective action.
The conjecture is motivated by the anecdotal observation of
the case law examined above. Even though Neri is one of the most
famous contract cases in the United States, it was not considered
by the court in Feinberg. Though Gongora did cite to Feinberg, the
court did not mention the Neri case, despite its notoriety and even
though it would appear to be binding precedent. McCann did not
cite to Neri, Feinberg, or Gongora. Nor, for that matter, did
Santos.
Even the cases that use the alternative approach are short on
use of authority. The Neri court failed to note its own prior dicta
in Proctor & Gamble Distributing Corp. that would have supported
a decision to reject the additive method to compute a final
restitution amount. Honsberg did not cite to any authority;
neither did Madsen v. Murrey & Sons Co., Inc., nor did Bowen v.
Gardner. To be sure, Anheuser considered Neri, and Conister
considered both Murrey and Anheuser, illustrating that all is not
lost.
In such a milieu, one should worry whether parties will
consult official comments to the UCC, the drafting history of a code
section, a Permanent Editorial Board comment, or other secondary
sources. None of the cases, whether additive method or alternative
approach, even recognize the possible drafting ambiguity inherent
in § 2-718(2) and (3). Most courts simply perform a calculation
without explaining the relationship of the statute to that
calculation. Later cases, which might have picked up on the
ambiguity in § 2-718 noted by Professor Pettit,171 predictably fail
to cite to secondary authority.
Moreover, the secondary literature that might help, if
consulted, is in disarray. Though one can put the Hawkland
treatise to good use as discussed in Part III, its analysis is
incomplete because it does not discuss the interpretive options
identified by Professor Pettit in 2000, nor does it cite to Neri. An
early law review article applied the additive method without
considering alternatives.172 The Anderson treatise is hopelessly
brief, managing an inconsistency nonetheless.173 In one section,
171

See Pettit, supra note 39, at 1496–97.
Robert J. Nordstrom, Restitution on Default and Article Two of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 19 VAND. L. REV. 1143, 1172–73 (1966).
173
4A Part II ANDERSON U.C.C. § 2-718:45 (3d ed.) (2017).
172
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Anderson cites to both Honsberg and Feinberg without noting the
different calculation methods used.174 Moreover, it too misses
Neri. Further, in another section, Anderson cites to a number of
alternative approach cases, without addressing the additive
method of Feinberg,175 missing Neri a second time, while
nevertheless citing to Proctor & Gamble.176 The Quinn’s treatise
fails to notice the difference between the additive method and the
alternative approach while citing to only two cases, Feinberg and
Anheuser v. Oswald Refractories Co., Inc.177 To the extent a court
or a litigant bothered to look, the secondary literature would not
help with the core analytical issue. At worst, consulting the
secondary literature might lead to the use of the additive method.
2.

Design Failure Number 2: The Cumbersome Amendment
Process

A system which requires two institutions, the ALI and the
ULC, to gear up the machinery of change and then engage fifty
state legislatures, is designed to address broad reform.178
Technical fixes tag along for the ride on those rare occasions when
this engine is started. One reason the UCC was drafted using
general terms that invite court development is the recognition that
the formal and cumbersome amendment process is unlikely to
respond rapidly to changing circumstances, new developments,
and the like.
Llewellyn had the notion, starting with the proposed Federal
Sales Act, of a “grand codificatory act”:
A codificatory Act covering a large body of private law must not
be treated as ordinary legislation. It is not ordinary legislation.
It is not legislation capable of easy or frequent amendment;
errors in it, if any, are rather to be suffered than amended, over

174

Id.
Id. at § 2-718:48.
176
Procter & Gamble Distrib. Co. v. Lawrence Am. Field Warehousing Corp., 16
N.Y.2d 344, 354–55, 266 N.Y.S.2d 785, 792–93 (1965).
177
2 QUINN'S UCC COMMENTARY & LAW DIGEST § 2-718[A][10] (Rev. 2d
ed.) (2018).
178
For a description of the coordination between the ALI and the ULC on a project
like the revision to Article 2, see Peter A. Alces & Chris Byrne, Is it Time for the
Restatement of Contracts, Fourth?, 11 DUQ. BUS. L.J. 195–96 (2009).
175
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very considerable periods. Such a codificatory Act is in a peculiar
sense permanent legislation; it enters into the commercial
structure of the country.179

In Llewellyn’s vision, a grand codificatory act relied essentially on
development and explication by courts, using a common law
methodology.
If ever there was legislation which is declaratory of principle,
which is in essence and intent the laying down of rules to be
developed by the courts as common law rules are themselves
developed by the courts, and molded to the succession of
unforeseen circumstances, this proposed Bill is such
legislation.180

When the revision of sales law moved from a focus on a federal
sales act to state law, Llewellyn continued to view the state law as
the same sort of grand codificatory act that amounted to
semi-permanent legislation.181
The abandonment of the federal sales act process, however,
compounded the problem. No longer would a single federal law be
able to set the tone for uniformity among the several states.
Passage of a grand codificatory act now required parallel action in
all the states. The United States Supreme Court case of Erie v.
Tompkins made the uniformity problem even more acute.182
Following Erie, the federal courts no longer would be able to set an
example in diversity cases by declaring a federal common law of
sales.183
This design feature, relying on the twin pillars of generality
and a common law-like stewardship by judges, can be a systemic
strength given the nature of the amendment process.
It
transforms into a weakness when transaction costs deter parties
and courts from engaging with legal developments external to the
text of the statute itself. The grand codificatory act simply does
not work when courts and parties do not consult the
179
K. N. Llewellyn, The Needed Federal Sales Act, 26 VA. L. REV. 558, 561 (1940)
(emphasis in original) (describing the proposed federal sales act as a codificatory act);
accord Miller, What Can We Learn, supra note 97, at 472 (noting that the design of
the UCC mitigates the need for frequent amendments).
180
Llewellyn, supra note 179, at 561–62 (emphasis in original).
181
Memorandum from Karl N. Llewellyn to the Executive Committee on Scope
and Program, National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Re:
Possible Uniform Commercial Code, reprinted in TWINING, supra note 138, at 582–83
(describing state uniform sales law as semi-permanent legislation).
182
304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
183
See Hiram Thomas, The Federal Sales Bill as Viewed by the Merchant and the
Practitioner, 26 VA. L. REV. 537, 539 (1940).
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supplementary material generated by the system. Changes in law
need to appear in the text of the statute to influence decisions in
small cases. The amendment process needs to provide for small
and technical changes which may nevertheless have a significant
impact. The statutory amendment process, at least to date, does
not feature this adaptiveness.
The amendment process for the UCC, however, has tended to
think big, with changes focused on comprehensive amendments to
entire articles or the inclusion of a new article altogether.
Familiar examples include the conceptual rethinking of Article 8,
which led to a significant rewrite of the law governing investment
securities, the addition of Article 2A to cover leases, and the failed
attempt at a large scale amendment to Article 2 governing sales.
The process of drafting a model act includes—and indeed may
properly prioritize—the normative function of stating what the
law should be. Disagreement over the normative directions of the
law doomed revised Article 2.184 Revised Article 2 was too big to
succeed. And yet, very few sections of the proposed revisions
attracted serious opposition.185 A new, scaled back revision to
Article 2 led by the ALI and the ULC, however, does not seem to
be in our immediate future.
The failure of the Article 2 revision process likely has a fairly
traditional explanation found in political science literature. In the
legislative process, interest groups exert pressure on legislators
who are concerned with reelection.
Political processes
systematically undervalue large diffuse group preferences and
overvalue small cohesive group preferences. Thus, a focused
business group has an advantage over scattered interests, such as
consumers.186 Groups like the ALI and the ULC likely were not
captured by business interests in this case, at least not on the large
number of beneficial amendments, which provoked no controversy.
Desired model legislation was produced on many points. However,
a traditional capture story, coupled with indifference to a whittled

184
Henry Deeb Gabriel, The 2003 Amendments of Article Two of the Uniform
Commercial Code: Eight Years or a Lifetime After Completion, 52 S. TEX. L. REV. 487,
494, 495 (2011) (identifying opposition to the treatment of deferred terms and scope
as the core problems).
185
Id. at 494.
186
See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND
THE THEORY OF GROUPS 128 (1965); see also RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION
38–49 (1982); TODD SANDLER, COLLECTIVE ACTION: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS
63–94 (1992).
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down project, played out in the various state legislatures.187 Many
beneficial technical amendments were not enacted for the simple
reason that they were contained in a much larger amendment.
Interest groups objected to some aspects of the large amendment,
but not to the technical improvements.
Given the focus of the ALI and the ULC on large, sweeping
projects, concerns affecting ordinary people were lost as collateral
damage when lobbyists successfully opposed the large amendment
to Article 2, which contained the needed technical fix. Perhaps a
failure to appreciate the potential impact of a $500 loss prevented
the elites from realizing what was lost when the amendment
process failed. This failure was not simply a lost opportunity to
address concerns over the treatment of deferred terms or
information and computer programs;188 it was a lost opportunity
to make the statute more just in its operation for ordinary people.
This example reveals that the design failure of the grand
amendment process comes with serious costs imposed when a
grand project fails. All the beneficial yet not controversial changes
are lost. The impact of these costs is cushioned when courts and
parties fall back upon case law decisions to resolve uncertainties
associated with the statutory text. This safety net fails, however,
when transaction costs cause parties and courts to use the UCC
like a civil code, ignoring precedent and other supplemental
sources.
To be sure, minor adjustments sometimes appear in
pronouncements from the Permanent Editorial Board (“PEB”).
While a PEB comment on the topic would not hurt, it is not clear
that the pronouncement would filter down to the courts in small
matters, particularly if small cases are administered like civil law
cases.

187
Gabriel, supra note 184, at 494 (suggesting that most opposition had been
eliminated in the drafting process but that left revised Article 2 with no champion).
To be sure, the UCC process is not immune to capture and influence at the drafting
stage; for example, witness the split of the Uniform Computer Information
Transactions Act (UCITA) into a separate project. See Brian D. McDonald, The
Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 461,
462 (2001).
188
Opposition to Revised Article 2’s attempt to address “information,” which
includes computer software, by industry groups appears to be one reason for the
failure of the amendment, among many, even though the revision process dropped
treatment of software licensing in 1999. See Miller, What Can We Learn, supra note
97, at 474.
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VI. THE WAY FORWARD
Llewellyn himself stated that a byproduct of the grand
codificatory act is that “errors in it, if any, are rather to be suffered
than amended, over very considerable periods” of time.189 While
the idea of suffering over a very considerable period of time may
be descriptively accurate, as a normative matter, it is questionable
whether it is acceptable to wait.190 It is sometimes said that justice
delayed is justice denied. What should be done about a problem
for which a correction was proposed through the amendment
process by 1999, included in a reconstituted amendment in 2003,
which was withdrawn in 2011?191 The end of 2019 approaches. It
did not seem to help that the ambiguity was identified in the
academic literature in at least 2000.192 No correction is pending
through the usual channels of law reform, which is not surprising.
Stewardship of the law requires that some step be taken in light
of growing income inequality.
A restatement project does not seem like the answer, though
it would not hurt. Restatements of law exhibit a trend toward
downsizing the scope of the project undertaken. In the commercial
law field, a current example is the project on the Restatement of
Consumer Contracts (“RCC”), which is proceeding in lieu of a new
restatement of the entire field of contracts.193 Unfortunately, that
project does not address deposit return calculations.194 The
problem with enlisting the draft RCC in the corrective effort rests
with the purely statutory nature of this problem. It is a UCC
drafting problem. The rationale the draft RCC uses for addressing
certain contract formation issues in consumer contracting is that
the problems addressed are, first and foremost, common law issues

189

Llewellyn, supra note 179, at 561.
Sometimes Llewellyn and other legal realists, as well as the UCC project itself,
are accused of being amoral. To be sure, Llewellyn and others advocated for the UCC
on the grounds that it was largely non-political in character. See Danzig, supra
note 138, at 627–28. This stance does not, however, create an argument for inaction
when an injustice has been identified.
191
U.C.C. 2003 AMENDMENTS TO ARTICLE 2 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N
2017) (Amendments Proposed in 2003 and Withdrawn from the Official Text in 2011).
192
See Pettit, supra note 39, at 1488, 1503.
193
Letter from Nat’l Consumer Law Ctr. to Am. Law Inst. Council Members (Jan.
10, 2018), https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/udap/13-ali-comments-council-draft-4.pdf
[hereinafter draft RCC].
194
Id.
190
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and not UCC issues, though clearly they are related to the UCC.195
No plausible case can be made that the deposit return calculation
problem is anything other than statutory.
Following the rules for restatements would be
straightforward if one focused a new restatement project on
statutory consumer issues.196 First, the meager case law shows a
majority rule following the alternative approach. Second, the
trend follows the additive method, which should not be followed
because of the third and fourth considerations. Third, the rule
that best leads to coherence in the law is the alternative approach
or the context sensitive method because it follows the general rule
for damages computation, which aims at compensation for loss,
rather than a provision for premium or penalty. Fourth, the
alternative approach or the context sensitive method is the more
desirable rule, particularly in times of increasing income
inequality, because it reduces outcomes producing unjust
enrichment.
There is no reason to think a restatement would receive the
required attention, so perhaps this is not a true missed
opportunity. This Article may be a success at multiple levels: if it
leads courts to apply a context sensitive method to deny a
premium or a penalty, if it leads to a correction in a future
restatement, or if it leads to a PEB Commentary. Perhaps the best
solution is the alternative of pushing for individual amendment to
§ 2-718, orchestrated on a state by state basis, without national
coordination through the ALI and ULC. The facts lead to the
conclusion, very reluctantly, that state by state amendment is the
best course for this problem.
As preface, the suggestion to replace fifty gridlocked state
legislative processes with fifty other potentially gridlocked
processes—but without elaborate institutional support—may
appear crazy or romantic. In defense, one can make a practical
case for a unique non-uniform amendment in New York alone,

195
In fact, a good case can be made that the Draft RCC mischaracterizes a UCC
issue as a common law issue in order to allow consideration of contract formation
issues for which statutory reform has failed. That, however, is another project for
another day.
196
The justification for such an examination of statutes impacting consumers
could be grounded in the Restatement Second treatment of the statute of frauds. For
an outline of the requirements for a restatement, see AM. LAW INST., A HANDBOOK
FOR ALI REPORTERS AND THOSE WHO REVIEW THEIR WORK 4–6 (2015) (presenting
excerpt of the Revised Style Manual approved by the ALI Council in January 2015).
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which would effectively redirect that jurisdiction away from the
recent, but misguided, case law. Effort should be spent in New
York, at the very least.
At a more theoretical level, one can understand the second
design failure of the cumbersome amendment process as not a core
failure, at least from the perspective of Llewellyn. Creating a
grand codificatory act did not have, as part of its purpose, the
creation of a legal device that would be responsive to an ongoing
democratic process. Indeed, Llewellyn told us repeatedly that any
of the various uniform sales acts, federal or state, would rarely be
amended.
These projects, in this sense, are conceived as
antidemocratic, even though the product of an initial democratic
process. This setup leaves open space for a democratic or popular
response to the codificatory act, if needed. Justice lives outside the
grand gesture.
Llewellyn, together with Hart and Sacks, were part of a
handful of scholars who seriously studied the legislative process.197
“Hart and Sacks were preeminently concerned with the law as a
vehicle of growth and with legislatures as maximizers of social
utilities.”198 For them, ideally, the lawmaker would actively shape
society for its betterment. In such a view, a lawmaker should not
sit around for decades allowing constituent suffering due to a
drafting error in a grand codificatory act.
In contrast, for Llewellyn, the primary task for the lawmaker
was to use a kind of situation sense to identify patterns and
practices appropriate to particular situations. The life situations
of a particular time and place suggest contours for an appropriate
law—law that was immanent in a particular fact-situation. The
lawmaker merely needs to articulate it. Indeed, for Llewellyn, it
was probably of secondary importance—or, perhaps, even a
bother—that legislators performed this role.199 The legislator’s
role was passive, not active. The fine tuning and the promotion of

197
See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW, at iii (1958).
198
Danzig, supra note 138, at 624.
199
Id. It is not germane to the point made here to engage in the debate over
whether, and to what extent, Danzig is correct about the degree of amorality in
Llewellyn’s approach. See Zipporah Batshaw Wiseman, The Limits of Vision: Karl
Llewellyn and the Merchant Rules, 100 HARV. L. REV. 465, 468 n.13 (1987) (disputing
Danzig’s characterization of Llewellyn’s thought). What is required is that a moral
stance be taken against the prospect of a long and extended period of suffering. See,
e.g., HART & SACKS, supra note 197, at 102–07 (arguing that the promotion of human
welfare should be a part of legal decision making).
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justice would be left to common law-trained judges in courts.
Despite the gridlock of established legislative avenues for
amendment,200 if one adopts the Hart and Sacks view of the
purpose of lawmaking—as requiring consideration of moral
imperatives rather than of anthropological observations—it
suggests legislators push for change, against the odds and through
nonstandard means, even if standing alone.
Sometimes,
uniformity may be a false god standing in the way of progress.
Though non-uniform amendments to the UCC generally are
disfavored as conflicting with the mission of the UCC to be
“uniform,”201 some states have adopted non-uniform amendments
without any negative impact.202
Importantly, this step is
recommended only after the uniform amendment process has
failed. Indeed, the first stated purpose of the UCC is to “simplify,
clarify, and modernize the law governing commercial
transactions.”203 This purpose is frustrated when the traditional
amendment process fails. Given this failure, one might accept
some shortcomings associated with non-uniformity, though as
discussed below, non-uniformity poses no real risks in this case.
Indeed, promotion of the first value of “clarity” may require
subordination of the value of “uniformity.”204
The need for a non-uniform amendment process to fix UCC
§ 2-718(2) and (3) is not related to the usual set of problems
infecting a uniform law process. When a uniform law process fails
effectively to protect consumer interests, the failure is in part
attributed to the absence of effective consumer representation in
the uniform law process.205 However, that does not appear to be

200
This study shows that law reform takes a long time. The original amendment
to protect defaulting buyers took over forty years and that was in a single state—New
York. The initial UCC project took over twenty years, depending on how one counts.
The failure of revised Article 2 took over twenty years.
201
See U.C.C. § 1-103(a)(3) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2018); Murray,
supra note 162, at 594 (“The need for uniformity in a commercial law statute is a sine
qua non of its existence.”); accord W. DAVID SLAWSON, BINDING PROMISES: THE LATE
20TH-CENTURY REFORMATION OF CONTRACT LAW 138 (1996).
202
This goes against the stated purpose in UCC § 1-103(a)(3) “to make uniform
the law among the various jurisdictions.”
203
U.C.C. § 1-103(a)(1).
204
This is particularly true when the hope exists that uniformity may be restored
by widespread adoption of the non-uniform amendment. The ALI and the ULC
may have a vast apparatus designed to achieve uniformity, but they do not have a
monopoly on uniformity.
205
See Kathleen Patchel, Interest Group Politics, Federalism, and the Uniform
Laws Process: Some Lessons from the Uniform Commercial Code, 78 MINN. L. REV. 83,
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the case here as Revised Article 2 contained the technical fix
required to eliminate the penalty. The problem, rather, was that
a good provision was eliminated when the overall Article 2 revision
project failed.
A large and complex literature discusses problems of uniform
law projects, which are beyond the present task to engage fully.206
However, a brief defense of a non-uniform amendment is
warranted.
In a taxonomy of non-uniform UCC amendments, three
different types stand out as unlikely to create the sort of
differences which destroy the rationale for a uniform code. In the
first camp are amendments to fix obvious problems, particularly
where case law developed a solution.207 “Obvious problems” are
problems caused by poor drafting, not those created by use of
flexible and open-textured terms. Often, case law uncovers these
types of ambiguity. If the non-uniform amendment operates in
parallel to a developed case law solution, there is little room for
conflict or confusion. The Massachusetts amendment to UCC
§ 2-207 governing the battle of the forms is of this type.208
Massachusetts amended its version of § 2-207(2) expressly to cover
both “different” and “additional” terms,209 a move generally arrived
at by case law.210 This type of small fix merely steers parties and
courts in the right direction without the need to consider precedent

126 (1993). Consumer group opposition—because the revision did not go far
enough—may have been part of the problem.
206
See, e.g., F. Stephen Knippenberg & William J. Woodward, Jr., Uniformity and
Efficiency in the Uniform Commercial Code: A Partial Research Agenda, 45 BUS. LAW.
2519, 2524 (1990).
207
For a discussion of types of amendments faced by the UCC editorial board
early in the adoption process, see Robert Braucher, The Uniform Commercial
Code—A Third Look?, 14 W. RES. L. REV. 7, 11 (1962). Professor Braucher writes,
“First and easiest is the correction of obvious error. Second is the resolution of
ambiguity disclosed by judicial decision.” Id.
208
MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 106, § 2-207 (1991).
209
The model version of the UCC does not include the word “different” in § 2207(2) governing a battle of the forms situation. Massachusetts added the term
“different” in its version of the UCC to clarify the ambiguity created when § 2-708(1)
refers to “different” and “additional” terms but § 2-207(2) refers only to “additional”
terms. See generally John L. Utz, More on the Battle of the Forms: The Treatment of
“Different” Terms Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 16 UCC L.J. 103 (1983)
(describing the drafting problem created by omission of the word “different”).
Michigan and Montana follow Massachusetts in adding the word “different.” See
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 440.2207 (West 2019); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-2-207(2)
(West 2019); HAWKLAND, supra note 14, at 181.
210
See, e.g., Northrop Corp. v. Litronic Indus., 29 F.3d 1173, 1175 (7th Cir. 1994).
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and secondary authority.211 Such an amendment should reduce
future transaction costs. It does not lead to unfair surprise or the
type of inconsistency, which might cause problems for interstate
transactions or the national economy.
In the second camp are non-uniform amendments, which
address matters of particularly local concern.212 An example is the
non-uniform amendment in Nebraska to address sales of grain by
non-merchants.213 Another is non-uniform amendments relating
to cooperative homes in New York.214 These changes actually
reflect a strength of having fifty different state laws rather than a
single federal sales act as originally planned for the UCC.215
Importantly, the local nature of the transactions addressed in
deposit return cases means that the non-uniformity is unlikely to
interfere with interstate transactions or the operation of a
national economy. This statement is true even though the local

211
Not everyone would agree with this characterization of the small statutory fix.
Some suggest that the change contravenes the “knock out” rule developed in most
jurisdictions. See Burnham, supra note 7, at 526 n.29. Generally, that is an argument
for another day, though Ionics, Inc. v. Elmwood Sensors, Inc. may support the view
that the drafting change is minor. 110 F.3d 184, 188–89 (1st Cir. 1997), overturning
Roto-Lith, Ltd. v. F.P. Bartlett & Co., 297 F.2d 497 (1st Cir. 1962). If not, we may have
an unfortunate instance of a clarifying amendment which fails to clarify. See
Braucher, supra note 207, at 11 (“Third, amendments which do not clarify have
sometimes been made for the purpose of clarification.”).
212
See, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce H. Kobayashi, An Economic Analysis of
Uniform State Laws, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 131, 141 (1996) (suggesting that one cost of
uniform laws may be the elimination of beneficial local variation). Professor Braucher
called a local variation of this sort “regrettable” but indicated that it posed “no problem
for the national sponsors.” Braucher, supra note 207, at 10.
213
Nebraska included a change to the UCC Article 2 statute of frauds, § 2-201, to
specifically address the case of transactions between a merchant and a buyer or seller
of grain who is not a merchant. See NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. U.C.C. § 2-201(2)(b) (2019).
South Dakota adopted a similar non-uniform amendment. See HAWKLAND, supra
note 14, at 181.
214
These appear in New York’s version of Article 9 and not Article 2. Oddly, New
York law treats co-op shares as “goods” under Article 2 pursuant to case law decision.
Silverman v. Alcoa Plaza Associates, 37 A.D.2d 166, 323 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1st Dep’t 1971).
215
To be complete, a federal sales act would not have applied to most small
transactions which are intrastate because the federal government would not have had
authority under the commerce power of the United States Constitution to regulate
those transactions. See George C. Bogert, The Proposed Federal Sales Act, 26 VA. L.
REV. 572, 584 (1940). Rather, the hope for the federal sales act process was that states
would pass parallel legislation out of concerns to conform. See Llewellyn, supra
note 179, at 562 (expressing the hope that new state legislation would conform to a
federal sales act). There is no reason, in principal, why a state law could not act as a
role model for other state laws, just as the proponents of the federal sales act project
anticipated a federal law would act as a model for intrastate transactions governed by
state law.
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nature of the transaction arises solely because it is intrastate—in
most cases—and not because of some unique aspect of the local
economy such as a concentration of farming or cooperative home
ownership.
In the third camp are non-uniform amendments, which
address public policy concerns of a particular state. An example
is Florida’s decision to eliminate UCC § 2-725 of Article 2, which
governs the statute of limitations. In most jurisdictions, the model
version of Article 2 , which permits the shortening of a statute of
limitations for suit in a sale of goods transaction, was adopted.216
Florida, however, has a public policy against shortening the
statute of limitations.217 Accordingly, Florida’s version of Article 2
simply omits § 2-725 altogether.
In this example, uniformity may be a negative by promoting a
“race to the bottom” structure in the law by allowing business
interests to avoid liability for breach of warranty claims to an
extent deemed unfair.218 Rather than yield to this “race to the
bottom,” the Florida legislators followed their better angels,
declining to place uniformity ahead of justice concerns, or so one
might surmise. Interestingly, this view of the Florida public policy
is indirectly supported by proposed revisions to Article 2, which
would have prevented the shortening of the statute of limitations
in a consumer transaction.219 Such a non-uniform provision might
be justified by appeals to fairness, whether or not grounded in
considerations of efficiency. In short, justice trumps uniformity.220
216

See, e.g., N.Y. U.C.C. § 2–725 (McKinney 2019).
See Burroughs Corp. v. Suntogs of Miami, Inc., 472 So. 2d 1166, 1167–68
(Fla. 1985).
218
See Janger, supra note 11, at 579–80; cf. William L.Cary, Federalism and
Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 665–66 (1974)
(introducing the idea of a “race to the bottom”).
219
U.C.C. § 2-725 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N, Proposed Amendments
to Article 2 Sales 2002) (Amendments Proposed in 2002 and Withdrawn from the
Official text in 2011).
220
Different statutes of limitation, however, have a dark side: they invite parties
to negotiate over which state’s version of the UCC applies to a transaction. Professor
Burnham has noted the irony of parties negotiating over which state’s Uniform
Commercial Code will provide the law. Burnham, supra note 7, at 526. Public policy
should have priority over uniformity even when it creates a downside. Addressing
deposit return calculations is one of those fortunate cases where a tradeoff need not
be made. Another example where justice appears to have prevailed over uniformity is
the Connecticut UCC, in which that state’s legislature addressed electronic devices
which disable car ignitions—a technique used in subprime auto lending to facilitate
repossessions and to “encourage” payments known as “electronic self-help.” See CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42a-9-609 (2001). See generally Michael Corkery & Jessica
Silver-Greenberg, Miss a Payment? Good Luck Moving That Car, N.Y. TIMES
217
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An amendment to UCC § 2-718 to eliminate the premium or
penalty is firmly in the third “public policy” camp even though
elements of a technical amendment and a local amendment are
present. Adoption of a public policy to eliminate the default rule
creating the penalty has particular appeal in the current economic
environment on fairness and justice grounds. A state could decide
to eliminate the premium or penalty without doing violence to the
general project of creating uniformity in state law while promoting
a more efficient and just law in this case. Several reasons support
this view.
First, on the analysis contained above, an amendment to UCC
§ 2-718 to eliminate the premium or penalty is merely a technical
amendment, reaffirming what the law already provides as
elucidated by the context sensitive method. However, in New
York, where the fix is most needed, it does more work even though,
arguably, it is technically just confirming Neri. The amendment
is promajoritarian in that it reaffirms legislative intent.
Second, the interpretation of the law needs to change in form,
but not in substance, to prevent courts from making a mistaken
application of law, particularly in small matters due to the
transaction cost limitations. In the small case, courts may treat
the UCC like a civil code, applying the law by a surface read of the
statute. In this milieu, in practice, the commercial code is not
functioning in a common law system with a robust body of
precedent as envisioned by its authors. Were the law functioning
as designed, courts would have corrected the problem in New York
by now. Reducing mistakes should lower transaction costs.
Third, in Florida, Missouri, Tennessee, and Utah, the
amendment is merely protective of results under existing case law,
guarding against a future court treating the UCC like a civil code
and arriving at the wrong result or being led astray by errant
secondary literature.221 In New York, an amendment will provide
a course correction to prevent lower courts from using the additive
method against the binding precedent of Neri. Elsewhere, the
change is simply good statutory hygiene.
Fourth, the cases in which the change matters are local,
intrastate transactions involving consumers or small businesses.
These matters are cases where non-uniformity does not matter
greatly.
(Sept. 24, 2014, 9:33 PM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/09/24/miss-a-paymentgood-luck-moving-that-car/ (discussing starter interrupt devices).
221
See supra notes 55–56.
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Fifth, the change clarifies a calculation consistent with the
general theory of contract damages and does not work a change in
doctrine. Consider, for example, eliminating the requirement that
consideration support an amendment to a contract.222 In so doing,
it reinforces the evolution of contract damages towards
recognizing restitution rights, an evolution specifically intended to
prevent unjust enrichment. Indeed, the original New York law
revision process which resulted in today’s UCC § 2-718 was
motivated to prevent buyers from unjustly enriching sellers and to
provide equal treatment between defaulting buyers and defaulting
sellers.
Contrast the three relatively benign examples of
non-uniformity offered above with non-uniform changes to the
scope of the UCC. For example, the Oklahoma exclusion of
“information” from the definition of “goods”223 to deny computer
software licenses coverage under Article 2—when UCC case law
generally goes the other way224—is destructive of uniformity of an
important kind, going against case law and complicating conflict
of law rules.225 This observation is true even though the Oklahoma
amendment may be correct, and case law wrong, as a matter of
statutory construction.226
Given the failure of the revision project for Article 2, a populist
program of revision may be necessary to save the UCC from
obsolescence.227 Careful selection of clauses for a populist revision

222

See U.C.C. § 2-205 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2018).
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 2-105 (West 2006).
224
Holly K. Towle, Enough Already: It Is Time To Acknowledge That UCC Article
2 Does Not Apply to Software and Other Information, 52 S. TEX. L. REV. 531,
532 (2011).
225
The annotations to the Oklahoma law suggest that, if a transaction includes
goods and information, the UCC may not apply to the information portion of the
contract.
More specifically, if a transaction is not fully within Article 2 but includes
information and goods, the article does not apply to the part involving
information, including informational rights in it and creation or modification
of it, or, as indicated above, to the media on which the information is
contained.
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 2-105 cmt. 1 (2006). This annotation invites application
of the “gravamen” test to a mixed transaction. In other types of mixed transactions, a
court typically applies the predominate purpose test. This non-uniform amendment
muddles up conflict of law rules used to determine choice of law in hybrid or mixed
transactions.
226
Towle, supra note 224, at 534, 536.
227
See Burnham, supra note 7, at 530 (suggesting that, absent amendment,
Article 2 may become as quaint and obsolete as the Field Code); accord Miller, A True
223
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may update and clarify the code without causing a failure of its
overall mission to create uniformity in the law, providing a
stop-gap until the engines of institutional reform reawaken.
CONCLUSION
The answer to Professor Murray’s question of who is
responsible for an effective Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial
Code may well be, “we are.”228 But “we” does not necessarily mean
the ALI and the ULC, as suggested by Professor Murray.229
Rather, in the case of small drafting matters, an alternative “we”
might be an effort led by contract law professors in each state
advocating for law reform, perhaps enlisting an army of students
in a teachable moment. A grassroots effort might achieve a
positive change in law where more formal avenues of law reform
have failed for almost twenty years.230 Widespread success would
show that the ULC does not have a monopoly on uniformity.

Story, supra note 97, at 143 (fretting over “the irreversible erosion of perhaps the most
significant state law in U.S. history”).
228
Murray, supra note 8, at 129.
229
In a best case scenario, the ALI and the ULC would initiate a radically
downsized UCC amendment process to identify, pass, and push to ratify the
non-controversial UCC revisions lost when the grand amendment failed. This is not a
simple case of institutional players playing badly. Quite the contrary. The ALI and
ULC made available several needed amendments reforming damage awards to make
the calculations more just. In this camp, I would include not only the proposed changes
to § 2-718, but also the revisions increasing the dollar amount for application of the
statute of frauds and allowing a seller to recover consequential damages. Providing
consequential damages for a seller historically equalized the treatment for sellers and
buyers, much as the long ago efforts aimed to equalize treatment of deposits for
defaulting buyers and defaulting sellers begun in 1942 in New York. A system which
only addresses the grand amendment is designed to produce costly failures when
failure occurs.
230
Enlisting the academic community was part of Llewellyn’s strategy for
passage of the UCC. See Wiseman, supra note 199, at 486 (noting “Llewellyn’s next
step was to mobilize the academic legal community for modernization”). Persons
interested in this project should understand its modest goals. The change will not
prevent consumers from paying a premium when they sign an agreement containing
a liquidated damages clause. Clarifying application of UCC § 2-718 (2) and (3) imposes
no mandatory restrictions on the substance of a contract. The “reform” suggested here
does not limit the discretion of a business by setting boundaries to permitted contract
terms. Most consumer layaway plans offered by major retailers include liquidated
damages clauses. They are not subject to default rules. The default rules governing
deposit returns apply when a non-defaulting seller has failed to make appropriate
plans or to draft a more complete agreement. This is likely to occur in more informal
settings or in single transactions, rather than in programmatic ones. For a description
of cases in which businessmen may fail to make appropriate plans, see Stewart
Macaulay, The Use and Non-Use of Contracts in the Manufacturing Industry, 9 PRAC.
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Three options exist for accomplishing an amendment to UCC
§ 2-718, depending on the substantive result desired. One simple
approach would be to adopt the version of § 2-718 contained in the
2003 Revised Article 2. This option has the advantage, from the
standpoint of a defaulting buyer, of eliminating entirely the
possibility of a deposit being used to pay any premium or penalty.
Further, it has the blessing of the ALI and the ULC. It has the
disadvantage in live cases of requiring a trial to determine actual
damages when the existing language might lead a non-defaulting
seller simply to accept the statutory amount. Additionally, it
works a change in the law in those cases where the base retention
amount exceeds actual damages.
A second option is to follow the lead of North Carolina and add
a subsection (2)(c) to § 2-718(2). The North Carolina version reads:
“at the election of the seller in the case of a layaway contract, the
aggregate payments received by seller from buyer under the
contract or fifty dollars ($50.00), whichever is smaller.”231
The North Carolina amendment was passed in 1993.232 The
section addresses only the context of a layaway plan, though its
express terms do not limit its application to consumers.233 As
applied, subsection (c) operates to create a new base retention
amount in the maximum amount of $50 for layaway plans. This
provision makes the penalty or premium a small issue even for
persons of modest means. The problem with the actual drafting is
that it includes the troublesome phrase, “at the election of the
seller,” making it hard to determine what this language is for,
unless it is to neuter the provision.234 No rational seller would
limit itself to a $50 retention if it had the option of a $500 retention
under (2)(b). If this language were eliminated, and application of

LAW. 13, 14–18 (1963). Nevertheless, the correction will help some and move the
expressive function of the law toward justice and fairness.
231
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 25-2-718(2)(c) (West 1993).
232
Act of July 14, 1993, ch. 340 (S.B. 709), 1993 N.C. Sess. Laws (amending the
North Carolina UCC to clarify and modify the law on layaway contracts).
233
The addition to North Carolina General Statutes § 25-2-718(2)(c) operates in
conjunction with a definition of “layaway contract” added to North Carolina General
Statutes § 25-2-106:
A “layaway contract” means any contract for the sale of goods in which the
seller agrees with the purchaser, in consideration for the purchaser’s
payment of a deposit, down payment, or similar initial payment, to hold
identified goods for future delivery upon the purchaser’s payment of a
specified additional amount, whether in installments or otherwise.
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 25-2-106(1) (West 1993).
234
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 25-2-718(2)(c) (West 1993).
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subsection (2)(c) were mandatory for layaway plans, consumers
would be protected. Properly drafted, such an approach addresses
the bulk of the social justice concerns raised by current UCC
§ 2-718(2) and (3). Given the statute’s drafting, and the absence
of case law or helpful official comment, it is hard to discern the
state of the law or whether persons of modest means currently are
protected in North Carolina. The point, however, is that such a
drafting approach could be made to work.
The third option, recommended here, merely clarifies existing
law to eliminate the additive method as a calculation option. This
option has the benefit of eliminating the premium or penalty in
the most egregious cases while retaining an incentive for a seller
to merely accept the basic retention amount without going to trial.
This approach has the further benefit of reaffirming the law as it
was intended to be applied while changing nothing else; in other
words, it leaves the small statutory liquidated damages provision
intact, eliminating the need to argue over whether it promotes
judicial economy. Thus, as a practical matter such an amendment
should be easily sold to state legislatures. The suggested
amendment language appears below.
SUGGESTED AMENDMENT TO SECTION 2-718 OF THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE:
***
(2) Where the seller justifiably withholds delivery of goods
because of the buyer’s breach, the buyer is entitled to restitution
of any amount by which the sum of his payments exceeds . . .
(b) . . . twenty per cent of the value of the total performance
for which the buyer is obligated under the contract or $500,
whichever is smaller.
(3) The buyer’s right to restitution under subsection (2) is
subject to offset to the extent that the seller establishes
(a) a right to recover damages in excess of the amount
retained under subsection (2)(b) under the provisions of this
Article other than subsection (1), and
(b) the amount or value of any benefits received by the
buyer directly or indirectly by reason of the contract.
***

